The Army of the Kings of Ur: The Textual Evidence

 

§1. Introduction

§1.1. The situation is paradoxical. During the last century of the 3rd millennium BC, several accounts testify that rulers of the Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III) conducted, from the heart of Sumer, several wars of conquest beyond the frontiers of their kingdom, probably influenced by the imperial model initiated roughly two centuries earlier by the kings of Akkad. And yet very few documents, with little detail in them, are available on the armies that led these military conquests. Moreover, we know little about how these kings organized, from a military point of view, the defenses either at the center or at the outskirts of their kingdom. Although the military organization of this period is extremely important to the history of ancient Mesopotamia, the total evidence that we have to date is so sketchy and incomplete that it allows only minimal insight.[1]

§1.2. Starting in the middle of his 48-year reign, the second ruler of the dynasty, Šulgi (Š, 2094-2047 BC in traditional chronology), launched the process of territorial expansion and conquest. The year names used to date the documents of that period, an essential source for any enquiry into military history,[2] show that he led campaigns against the cities or territories of:

• Dêr (year 21, zone A of the map below, figure 1)
• Karahar (year 24, then 31; zone B)
• Simurum (years 26, 32 and 44; zone B)[3]
• Harši (year 27, then 48; zone B)
• Anšan (year 34; zone D)
• Šašrum (year 42; zone C; Šušarra of the OB period)
• Urbilum (year 45; zone C, present Erbil)
• Kimaš (year 46, then 48; zone B)
• Hu’urti (year 48; zone B)

§1.3. Military expeditions continued under Šulgi’s three successors, even if they were less frequent toward the end of the period:

Amar-Suen (AS):	Urbilum (year 2, zone C)
	Šašrum (year 6, zone C)
	Huhnuri (year 7, zone D)
Šu-Suen (ŠS):	Simanum (year 3, zone C)
	Zabšali (year 7, zone C)
Ibbi-Suen (IS):	Simurum (year 3, zone B)
	Huhnuri/Anšan (year 9, zone D)
	Susa/AdamDUN/Awan (year 14, Khuzistan)

§1.4. When we examine these year names in detail, we observe that through almost half a century, once every two to four years and sometimes every year, major military campaigns were undertaken beyond the frontiers of the kingdom. Together, the campaigns constituted a policy of expansion that also had a preventive and defensive objective, with an eye to the potential threat represented by populations beyond the borders of the realm. Some of these campaigns were of sufficient importance to be remembered in the literary oracular tradition as late as the Seleucid period.[4] All of them were carried out in two main directions (figure 1):

• The Zagros area (with the Diyala and the two Zab regions) and the Upper Tigris area (Kurdistan),[5]
• Susiana (Khuzistan), Elam and southern/southeastern Iran (Fars and toward the Kerman).[6]

 

Figure 1: Map of the Ur III Empire.

§1.5. At the height of the Ur III expansion, therefore, a considerable territory was encompassed, stretching from southeastern Anatolia to the Iranian shore of the Persian Gulf. But in contrast to the situation during the Akkadian expansion, the Middle Euphrates and Khabur regions, along with the central and western parts of Syria, remained almost unaffected by these campaigns.[7] Relations with these western and northwestern areas seem to have been peaceful,[8] based mainly on a close alliance with Mari.[9] Danger (and especially the “Amorite” danger) never came from the west for the kings of Ur.

§1.6. These military expeditions by these Neo-Sumerian kings, often conducted in difficult mountainous areas and remote regions, sometimes over a thousand kilometers from the city of Ur as the crow flies, must have constituted major undertakings, requiring a strong military organization with complex logistical capacities. It is naturally frustrating, therefore, to find that the massive documentation for this period[10] contains virtually no evidence about either these armies or the kingdom’s military organization in general. Even with such a quantity of texts, we cannot clearly fathom how soldiers were recruited, supplied, maintained, equipped, armed, organized, disciplined and launched into battle. Investigations based on the remains of the Neo-Sumerian bureaucracy yield few results, though these can be interesting and informative. We are left with the feeling that no proper military administration ever existed, solely because we lack archives relevant to the subject (but see fn. 1 above).

§1.7. Without such archives, the only possible method for research on the Ur III armies is to assemble scattered evidence from the multitude of available sources (administrative archives, royal inscriptions, literary texts, etc.), trying wherever possible to cross-check them with available archaeological and iconographic evidence. In the end, this process constitutes a considerable investigation that, if sufficiently exhaustive, would lead far beyond what is feasible within the scope of this contribution. We will thus attempt here only to explore selected lines of research.

§2. Some characteristic military vocabulary in the administrative archives

§2.1. To conduct such an enquiry, we can of course begin by gathering all the Ur III administrative texts that mention “soldiers” (aga3-us2, erin2). But with the resulting amalgam of records, many of them not relevant, it becomes difficult to create a meaningful classification. Nevertheless, we will naturally return to these different categories of soldiers and what can be learned from this mass of references (below §4).

§2.2. Another characteristic term to look for is nam-ra-ak, Akk. šallatum, “booty.” The hundred or so texts that mention this word show in clear chronological terms the opportunities seized by the Ur III armies to pile up and bring back loot in the course of their victorious campaigns. These often corroborate the evidence from year names or royal inscriptions mentioning the relevant military expeditions:[11]

• nam-ra-ak an-ša-anki (Š 33)
• nam-ra-ak kur mar-du2 (Š 40, Š 44, Š 46, Š 47, Š 48, AS 1, AS 4)[12]
• nam-ra-ak lu-lu-buki (Š 44, cf. Maeda 1992: 157)
• nam-ra-ak šu-ru-ud-hu-umki (Š 44, AS 4)
• nam-ra-ak ur-bil3-lumki-ma (Š 45, Š 48)
• nam-ra-ak LU2.SU(.A) (Š 47, Š 48)[13]
• nam-ra-ak ha-ar-šiki (Š 48)
• nam-ra-ak hu-ur5-tiki (Š 48)
• nam-ra-ak ki-maški (Š 48)
• nam-ra-ak ša-aš-ruki u3 šu-ru-ud-hu-umki (AS 4)
• nam-ra-ak iri nergalki / iri mes-lam-ta-e3-a (AS 5)

§2.3. We can see from this list that the Šulgi campaigns were by far the most profitable in terms of booty taken from the enemy, and that the kings of Ur ceased to earn war treasure by the middle of Amar-Suen’s reign. After the 5th year of this king, there is no more evidence of booty. Further detailed analysis is needed, but a quick review of all the texts and documents gathered thus shows that the “loot” mainly consisted of men (lu2 nam-ra-ak),[14] women (geme2 nam-ra-ak),[15] and animals (gu4nam-ra-ak / udu nam-ra-ak / maš2 nam-ra-ak).[16] All of these had to be kept and fed (ša3-gal nam-ra-ak / še-ba nam-ra-ak / i3-ba nam-ra-ak).[17] The booty also consisted of materials, including wool (siki nam-ra-ak, BPOA 6, 796[18]), tarred baskets with unspecified contents (TCL 5, 6036), valued metal objects (TSU 39), animal skins (Princeton 1, 130; OIP 115, 355), etc. These texts also illuminate how the army, after returning home, could offer booty recovered from war to the king (Ontario 1, 50, etc.) and to the gods.[19]

§2.4. All this evidence for “booty” is significant in that it shows the extent to which these armies, in their campaigns, were predatory conquerors, not just sitting virtually and feeding themselves on the backs of the vanquished,[20] but also bringing back home (at least until the mid-reign of Amar-Suen) a surplus (slaves, livestock, treasures, various objects and materials), of which the king and the temples were the main beneficiaries.

§2.5. Another similar search can be conducted concerning the Sumerian word ugnim, Akk. ummānum. Does this word simply mean “army”/“troops,”[21] or does it also represent a “military camp” and even a proper name for the place where one of these camps was located, especially when written with the {ki} determinative, characteristic of place names?[22] R. Englund, who addressed this question some years ago, believed that ugnim was “The military troop gathered on the occasion of the implementation of an expedition.”[23] Beyond this definition, it is worth noting that the fifty or so references to this word (not so many, in fact), which is subject to frequent variations in spelling, mainly come from Girsu.[24] Would this mean that only the province of Girsu brought together, in one particular place, the whole royal army before departing on a foreign campaign? Whatever the answer, it is worth noting the following categories and professions that are frequently associated with the word ugnim:

a)	erin2 ugnim(ki) (ITT 4, 7131; MVN 3, 257; TCTI 2, 4262; HLC 27)
b)	ugula / nu-banda3 ugnim(ki) (CT 1, 4-5, BM 17744; HLC 2)
c)	lu2-nig2-dab5 ugnim(ki) (CT 10, 45 BM 21394; MVN 11, F; TUT 251; CT 9, 47 BM 19100; HLC384)
d)	šabra ugnimki (ASJ 14, 232 83)
e)	dub-sar ugnim-ma (Ontario 2, 504)
f)	giri3-se3-ga ugnim(ki) (HLC 29; HLC 2; MVN 2, 115; ASJ 19, 144 128; UNT 16; MVN 17, 34)
g)	geme2 kikken2 ugnim(ki) (CT 10 44 BM 19065; MVN 2, 176; HSS 4, 3; HLC 291; STA 10)
h)	bahar2 ugnimki (TUT 154; MVN 22, 171)

We see thus that the ugnim would appear—at least at Girsu—to be a kind of military establishment, clearly organized in the form of a “household” (e2, Akkadian bītum). In fact, we find inside it:

• On one side (a, b, c), all the soldiers (erin2), officers (ugula / nu-banda3) and a specific category of recruited men (lu2-nig2-dab5)[25]: in short, the troop and its officers;
• And on the other side (d, e, f, g, h), the administration and the supply corps in charge of the functioning and provision of the whole group: chief-manager (šabra), scribes (dub-sar), servants (giri3-se3-ga), millers (geme2 kikken2), potters (bahar2), etc.

§2.6. The relevance of the ugnim is highlighted by another text that warrants citation in detail. Like all the others, this text comes from Girsu, and it dates to the year IS 3:

[A] Owen 1973: 135, 3 (Fs. Gordon 1)

(1) 532;0,3. še gur (2) 158 ziz2 gur (3) erin2 ugnimki(=KI.SU.LU.ŠE3.GAR.KI)-ma-ke4-ne (4) u4 kaskal mar-du2 -še3 i3-re-ša-a (5) šu ba-ab-ti (6) kišib3 lu2-dnanna (7) u3 iš-ku-un-e2-a (8) ki gu-za-na-ta (9) u3-ma-ni šu ba-ti (Date: -/vii/IS 3)

“159,600 liters of barley (and) 47,400 liters of flour, received by the troops of the military camp when they went on an expedition against the Amorites. Sealed tablets of Lu-Nanna and Iškun-Ea from Guzana did Umani receive.”

Above all, it is the quantity of food distributed to the soldiers of the ugnim (here with the {ki} determinative) that calls for attention: it is considerable (200,000 liters) and therefore shows that a huge army was involved.[26] Furthermore, the two individuals who signed by rolling their seals on the tablets are well known to be generals (šagina) in the royal army. And Guzana, who delivered the grain, is known as an important supplier of the troops with various commodities.[27] Unfortunately, this campaign against the Amorites in the second year of Ibbi-Suen left few other traces in the documentation; at that time, the situation had become difficult for the last king of Ur, precisely because of the Amorite threat.[28]

§2.7. Another administrative tablet is also instructive concerning the ugnim:

[B] MVN 10, 149 ii 6-9[29]

(6) 70 guruš u4 1-še3 (7) ugnim(=SU.KU.ŠE3.KI.GAR.RA) ma2-ganki-še3 bala-a (8) 30 guruš u4 1-še2 (9) ugnim(=SU.KU.ŠE3.KI.GAR.RA) an-ša-anki-ta bala-a

“70 workmen days having ensured the transfer of the army as far as Magan; 30 workmen days having ensured the transfer (back) of the army from Anšan”.

In this exceptional piece of text, belonging to a small dossier concerning the military campaign led by Šulgi against Anšan,[30] we see the army mustered and dispatched on expedition by the king, thus taken in charge and transported by some men—likely mariners maneuvering the ships—as far as Magan, far away at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Then on returning, the same army was taken in charge again for its transportation, this time from Anšan in Iran and by a smaller number of men, perhaps because of casualties in battle or because the return trip was easier. This text, which is dated precisely to the “year when Anšan was destroyed.” (Š 34) is also interesting for its evidence regarding the maritime route used for the journey to fight against Anšan.

§2.8. Finally, based on the contexts and origin of the documentation, the ugnim seems to be both the meeting place or departure camp for the royal army, flanked by stewardship and general supply corps, and the army itself once “on the march” (cf. Latin agmen) or ready to go after being mustered.

§2.9. One last relevant word in the available records is the term kaskal, Akk. harrānum, gerrum, “expedition.” If we set aside the numerous uses of this word in the messenger texts, some interesting documents still remain. Thus, for example, this account tablet from Drehem dated 25/vii/AS 6:

[C] SAT 2, 913 = MVN 5, 115

(1) 12 udu (2) 83 u8 (3) 25 maš2 (4) 35 ud5 (5) mu aga3-us2 kaskal-ta er-ra-ne-še3

“12 sheep, 83 ewes, 25 male and 35 female goats for the soldiers who have returned from expedition.”

In total, 155 head of small livestock were thus kept for feeding soldiers in the regular army (for aga3-us2 see below, §4), returning from a campaign. If we consider that all this meat was consumed at one time (though this is not proven), knowing that one sheep can feed approximately sixty people,[31]roughly 9,000 men would have benefited from this expense (see below, §8, for the numbers of the royal army).

§2.10. We find similar feeding distributions in a similar context with a batch of three tablets from Umma, all dated to the year ŠS 1, but without specification of a day:

[D] UCP 9-2-2, 7, TCNU 507, Nik 2, 337

4 kaš DU gur / aga3-us2 kaskal-ta / gen-na

“1,200 liters of ordinary beer for the soldiers who have returned from expedition” (in the third text, the quantity is 4,4.1. kaš gur = 1,450 liters).

This time, it is beer that has been delivered to the soldiers after a military expedition, and on three successive(?) occasions. This could be related to the well attested custom of the banquet offered by the king to his troops after return from a victorious campaign. Such a custom is documented, for example, through a series of Umma tablets concerning the naptanum-banquets.[32] Here, if we estimate two liters per person and per occasion, it might well be that between 600 to 700 soldiers received beer at Umma under these circumstances.

§2.11. And several of these military expeditions (kaskal) are also mentioned in some Umma tablets, on the occasion of propitiatory offerings made to the “standard-weapon going on the campaign” (šu-nirgeštukul kaskal-še3 gen-na) and around which the army was probably ready to be on the move (OrSP47-49, 344; MVN 4, 263; MVN 2, 52; MVN 5, 46; UTI 5, 3424; MVN 16, 655; CHEU 19; the dates of these expeditions are given, respectively: xii/AS 5, xii/AS 5, iii/AS 6, -/AS 6, -/ŠS 2, iii/ŠS 3, iii/ŠS 4; they probably refer to the campaigns that were undertaken against Šašrum for Amar-Suen and against Simanum for Šu-Suen).

§2.12. Finally, this kind of enquiry into “some characteristic military vocabulary in the administrative archives” could be pursued for several other words, such as the names of weapons (see below §6). We must reemphasize here that such research is very substantially facilitated by the electronic databases BDTNS and CDLI, allowing for exhaustive search of the data, which are then possible to sort according to multiple criteria (date, place of origin, etc.).

§3. The contribution of literary texts and sources other than administrative

§3.1. We have seen how the year names that date the administrative documents of the five kings of Ur are important for reconstructing a military history of this period (above §1). Several successful investigations have linked these year names to administrative archival documents or royal inscriptions, which give some evidence for how these campaigns were conducted.[33] But as for the year names themselves, how should we understand one such as the year Šulgi 20?

[E] Year name Šulgi 20

mu dumu uri5ki-ma lu2-geš-gid2-še3 ka ba-ab-keš2

“Year the citizens of Ur were drafted as spearmen.”

In 1987, P. Steinkeller proposed that in this particular year, Šulgi established a new professional army in the framework of a series of vigorous reforms undertaken during the last two-thirds of his long reign.[34] This view has since been debated,[35] and the event reported here may be a simple and small one, certainly interesting in itself, but limited in its effect and perhaps linked only, in this particular year, to the need for an additional corps of spearmen in the army.[36]

§3.2. The royal Correspondence of Ur also offers useful evidence for military organization. Without returning to the ongoing debate over the “authenticity” of the relevant documents,[37] the letter RCU 1shows the royal grand vizier Aradmu reporting to king Šulgi that he met with Apillaša, a military chief in the Zagros region. Aradmu says the following about Apillaša:

[F] RCU 1

(19) aga3-us2 sag-ga2-na 5 li-mu-um-ta-am3 zi-da gub3-bu-na ib2-ta-an-gub-bu-uš

“To his right and left he had his elite(?) soldiers stationed, five thousand at each side.”

Here, we have a powerful military commander, appointed by the king of Ur, and about whom we learn that the troops available to him consisted of at least 2 × 5,000 = 10,000 soldiers. These are defined as aga3-us2 sag-ga2-na, literally “soldiers of his head.” sometimes translated as “elite soldiers.”[38] No other text from this period refers explicitly to so many soldiers at one time. Apillaša is a well known figure in the Ur III documentation:[39] he was a very important military chief, and we will encounter further records concerning him (below text [Q]). But what is most important here is to see the stage set for the homecoming of a royal envoy, Aradmu, whom Apillaša received at the head of his elite force composed of ten thousand soldiers.[40]

§3.3. On the crucial question of conscription, the Gudea Cylinder A offers important and unique evidence. This text helps understand how troops could be raised at the heart of the Lagaš kingdom, just before this land was incorporated into the domain of the kings at Ur. We find the following:[41]

[G] Gudea Cylinder A, col. xiv

(7) u4-ba ensi2-ke4 kalam-ma-na zi-ga ba-ni-gar

(…)

(11) iri du3-a a2-dam-gar-ra-na

(12) gu2 geš-ba-ra dnanše-ka

(13) zi-ga ba-ni-gar

(14) gu4 huš zi-ga gaba-gi4 nu-tuku

(15) gešeren babbar2-ra lugal-bi-ir dab6-ba

(16) im-ru-a dnin-gir2-su-ka-ka

(17) zi-ga mu-na-gal2

(18) šu-nir-mah-bi lugal kur dub2 sag-bi-a mu-gub

“In those days the ruler (= Gudea) imposed a levy on his land.[42] (…) On his built-up cities, his rural settlements, on the edge of the desert[43] of Nanše, he imposed a levy. There was a levy for him on Ningirsu’s clans (having the emblem) ‘Rampant fierce bull that has no one to oppose it’ (and) ‘White cedar passing along for its master,’ and he placed their magnificent standard, ‘King who makes the mountain tremble,’ in front of them.”

In this passage, which in fact continues to l. 27, we can see how Gudea undertook a systematic draft of all the population liable to corvée throughout his land, in order to complete the building of Ningirsu’s temple. This is one of the rare documents from this period that alludes to the conscription process. Furthermore, it shows how this conscription was carried out by clan or tribe (im-ru-a), each one with its emblem (šu-nir) or totem, and that no one was exempt. In this case, the conscription involves enrollment for public works, of course, but we can imagine in all likelihood a similar procedure for enrollment into the army when there was a need to go to war.

§3.4. Another literary text from this period, the Šulgi Hymn D, provides several details regarding the weapons used in battle (see below §6). In the section of this composition that mentions the destruction of his enemies, Šulgi affirms at first:[44] “I set up my emblem at the border of the foreign lands” (geššu-nir-gu10 kur-ra zag-ba ga-am3-du3, l. 177). Then he describes the range of weapons that he would use and specifies what effect would each one would have on his opponents: the spear (geš-gid2-da, l. 177), the battle axe (geštukul-ha-zi-in, l. 191), the complex bow(?) (GEŠ.ŠUB=illuru)[45] and other weapons for which the translation is uncertain. This section also mentions the regular bow (gešban, l. 180), arrows (gešti, l. 181) and the quiver (e2-mar-uru5, l. 179). Main of these are offensive weapons, which would ensure him victory.

§3.5. These literary passages on weapons and their use are echoed in the last literary text that we will mention here: the Lamentation over the destruction of Sumer and Ur, which likewise alludes to the weapons used to fight:[46]

[H] LDSU

(382) uri5ki-ma urudaha-zi-in gal-gal-e igi-bi-še3 u3-sar i3-ak-e

(383) geš-gid2-da a2 me3-ke4 si ib2-sa2-sa2-e-ne

(384) gešban gal-gal gešilluru kuše-ib2-ur3-ra teš2 im-da-gu7-e

(385) gešti-zu2-ke4 muru9 šeg3-ga2-gin7 bar-ba mi-ni-in-si

(386) na4 gal-gal-e ni2-bi-a pu-ud-pa-ad im-mi-ni-ib-za

“In front of the city of Ur, formidable battle axes were sharpened. Spears, the arms of battle, were made ready. The leather shields were being devoured by the terrible bows and the complex bows, all together. Barbed arrows covered their outer surfaces as if from a storm cloud. Formidable (sling-)stones fell together with great thuds.”

We can observe through these examples that the army’s offensive weaponry seems to include: battle axes and spears for the hand-to-hand combat, and bows and slings for striking at a distance.

§3.6. From a methodological point of view, these few examples show how we may proceed to collect further evidence on our subject. By pursuing such enquiries, and by creating a synthesis of the results, we can address several important questions relating to armies in antiquity: military organization, hierarchy, weaponry, garrisons, and force. These five points are treated directly in the remainder of this article.

§4. The troops, the regular army and the different categories of soldiers

§4.1. To begin in brief, we must keep in mind an essential principle: the army, when mobilized, probably essentially consisted of the male population of the kingdom. Every able-bodied man (called guruš in the texts) could be called up for duty when troops were mustered throughout the land, as seen in the Gudea text (§3.3 text [G]). Throughout the year, every man (guruš) was thus obliged to devote a fixed time in service as a “member of the troop” (erin2, Akk. şābum). He could then, depending on situation and need, be assigned either to work on civil projects such as construction, drainage, agriculture, etc., or to military service.

§4.2. Thus, as evident in the archival texts, the administration classified each individual according to whether he was on active duty, in the category of erin2 bala gub-ba; or he was free from current service and was placed under the category of erin2 bala tuš-a. K. Maekawa, to whom we are indebted for this discovery, has shown in several articles[47] how the alternating status of the erin2 was managed on a monthly basis in the framework of corvée. At Girsu, they passed from one month to the other, from the erin2 bala-gub-ba category to the erin2 bala-tuš-a category. Logically, this monthly rhythm seems impractical for military conscription, but evidence is lacking on this matter and, as stated by K. Maekawa, “the yearly length of days of the corvée to be assigned to a single person still remains to be studied.”[48] Nevertheless, based on both the Girsu and the Umma archives, it is conceivable that the erin2 would have devoted at least half of their time to state service.[49]

§4.3. The extensive Ur III administrative documentation shows what kind of severe control was exercised on the population, so that no one could escape this form of conscription, whether civil or military. In some cases, men could be “seized by weapons” (geštukul-e dab5-ba). Texts also mention several categories of “seized” or “dragooned” individuals (lu2-dab5-ba, dumu-dab5-ba, gan-dab5-ba, etc.),[50] as well as individuals who tried to escape, and as a result had to face punishment and imprisonment, once they surrendered or were caught.[51] We are quite well informed about these people during their time in service, thanks to the many texts recording the rations, food or otherwise, that were delivered to them at that time, and to the tablets relating to their work assignments.

§4.4. Finally, even without definitive proof, it is reasonable to think that the assignments of the erin2, when they were “on duty” (erin2 bala gub-ba), were organized so as to cater to the needs of the state, not only for civil works (corvée), but also for all the military obligations: garrison service, internal defense and security for the kingdom, expeditions abroad, etc. This explains the many references to erin2 in military contexts (see for example the erin2 kaskal-še3, troops ready to go in an expedition:BIN 5, 135; MVN 10, 216; etc.). Still, we do not know in detail either how the male population of the kingdom was called into the army or how it was actually gathered and organized for these military duties (but see above §2.7-8 the function of the ugnim).

§4.5. Besides the erin2 troops, for which a mandatory but temporary service was imposed, the texts clearly show that there was also a permanent army, composed of professional privates. These are the aga3-us2, Akk. rēdû, “professional soldiers.” This Sumerian word appears for the first time in the Presargonic documentation from Lagaš, but it also is known at Ebla.[52] An abundant literature on the term is already available, and there is no point in reviewing it all here. The prevailing idea, however, is that the aga3-us2 would not appear to be a real “soldier” as such, but more a kind of “guard.” considering the numerous civil security activities in which he seems to have been involved.[53]

§4.6. Against the prevailing view, some arguments assert that, during the Ur III period, the aga3-us2was first and foremost a professional soldier of the standing army.[54] Many records clearly show the aga3-us2 in specifically military activities (some examples above §2.9-10 texts [C] and [D]), particularly in the entourage of the king and of the army’s leadership (below text [O]). His life was that of a soldier (below §7 about garrisons); he was provided with weapons, for the use of which a regular regime of training was necessary (below §6 text [Q] and TIM 6, 36), and he clearly served under a military chain of command (below §5).

§4.7. Nevertheless, as war was obviously not a permanent situation, and the armed forces under royal power could easily be deployed in many sectors of civilian life and administration, especially to ensure internal order and security, the aga3-us2 could also be employed:

• as personal bodyguards, not only for the king’s guard of course (aga3-us2 lugal), but also for the highest officials and department heads of the administration (aga3-us2 sukkal-mah / aga3-us2ensi2 / aga3-us2 sanga / aga3-us2 šabra / aga3-us2 šar2-ra-ab-du / aga3-us2 nu-banda3-gu4 / aga3-us2 zabar-dab5 / aga3-us2 PISAN-dub-ba / aga3-us2 PN);[55]
• as part of teams in charge of maintaining order and security in the many administrative and official households, establishments and production units (e2 and various giri3-se3-ga) of the kingdom.[56]See also, in this category, some specialized aga3-us2, such as the aga3-us2 i3-du8, “main door guard / janitor” (SET 270 ii 41) for example, or the aga3-us2 ka (for ka2) e2-gal-ka, “soldiers of the palace gate”;[57]
• as messengers or couriers (see below § 4.8-9), acting sometimes as representatives with diplomatic or political capacity (aga3-us2 kin-gi4-a);[58]
• as constables in charge of communications, circulation and transportation. They could even, in the latter case, be used for towing boats, providing security for convoys and supervising transportation teams, on the canal network that enabled circulation through the land of Sumer. This is notably evidenced by the many references connecting aga3-us2 to boats and involving them in inland water transport activities (see for example below, §4.16, or the many texts showing the activity of aga3-us2 ma2-gid2, “boat towing soldiers”). In many cases we also find aga3-us2 messengers acting as guides, or escorting individuals or groups. See also, along the same lines, the numerous records that mention aga3-us2 acting as official “intermediaries” or “conveyors” (giri3) in administrative operations;
• in specified and one-time tasks requiring an abundant but temporary labor force, such as shearing sheep (SACT 2, 291), or especially during the harvest or for special agricultural tasks. The regular army could then be requisitioned by the authorities in addition to other categories of the population; see, for example:
  — TCTI 1, 621 i 9 (with 732 aga3-us2)
  — TÉL 239a i 13 (with 761 aga3-us2)
  — TCTI 1, 742 i 10 (with 796 aga3-us2)
  — ASJ 13, 227 72 ii 9 (with 900 guruš u4 1-še3 = aga3-us2 lugal-me)
  — ASJ 19, 141 126, 23 // TCTI 2, 3817 (with 9,600 aga3-us2)
  — ASJ 8, 118 33, 9 (with 10,800 aga3-us2)
  These last two texts provide quite exceptional numbers—approximately 10,000 men. They represent perhaps the entire population of aga3-us2 available at a given time in the Girsu province. All this offers useful insight regarding the numbers in the professional army (see below §8).

§4.8. Two observations can be made regarding the many references to aga3-us2 in the specific tablets called messenger texts, besides the fact that the missions entrusted to them were extremely varied.[59]First, in the messenger texts of Girsu, there is a category labeled as aga3-us2 gal and aga3-us2 gal-gal that occurs only in this kind of tablet and almost exclusively at Girsu.[60] This category must refer to a distinctive group of special aga3-us2, appointed by the royal power to a particular communications service in the Girsu province. Accordingly, the epithet gal and gal-gal here are specific and have no hierarchical value in connection to the other categories of aga3-us2 soldiers serving in the army (see below §5 on the chain of command).

§4.9. Second, in the messenger texts of Umma,[61] one could consider it odd that no aga3-us2 ever appears explicitly, unlike in the Girsu messenger texts. This leads then to ask whether the aga3-us2may not in reality be hidden behind the professional category denoted ka-us2-sa2, which is peculiar to the Umma messenger texts. Thus, ka-us2-sa2 would only be a local phonetic variant of the aga3-us2. The contexts in which these ka-us2-sa2 appear at Umma fit well with such an idea.[62]

§4.10. In conclusion, all these examples suggest that even if the aga3-us2 were military professionals of the standing army, they were also responsible within the kingdom for internal security, including the protection of state officials and public institutions. They had to oversee various types of movement within the land, ensuring the proper functioning of transportation and communications systems for the entire territory. In ordinary times, the aga3-us2 role could finally be compared in a way, mutatis mutandis and through the millennia, to the role played today in France by “gendarmes.” In this country, the gendarmes depend specifically on the Ministry of Defense and not on the Ministry of the Interior, as opposed to the police force; they are therefore soldiers.

§4.11. Classically, and like other categories of permanent dependants of the royal administration, remuneration of the aga3-us2 was organized through the allocation of cultivable land on one hand,[63]and by the well known system of “rations” distribution on the other hand (see above, fn. 32). Many text files record such allocations to the aga3-us2 for various types of rations: barley (še-ba aga3-us2), oil (i3-ba aga3-us2), fish (ku6-ba aga3-us2), wool (siki-ba aga3-us2), clothing (tug2-ba aga3-us2).[64] We will also quote below (§4.20 texts [J] and [K]) two administrative letters that evoke the way in which the aga3-us2 were remunerated.

§4.12. We may also understand that these professional aga3-us2 were those who could hold cylinder seals in their name, proving their status as state officials.[65] We currently know a hundred or so different cylinder seal impressions of aga3-us2 for the Ur III period. The great majority of these seals are from the archives of Umma. And it is worth noting that most of their holders are aga3-us2 lugal or aga3-us2 ensi2, therefore in the service of the king or of the governor of Umma. In other respects, we can see that these professional aga3-us2 had full legal capacity. They acted sometimes as witnesses in legal transactions (igi+PN, lu2 inim-ma-bi-me, etc.) or they possessed slaves of their own (for example:ITT 2, 3516 = NSGU 166, ll. 15-17).

§4.13. If we thus accept that the Ur III aga3-us2 were professional soldiers of the royal army, also employed for all kinds of occupations in logistics, communication and security duties throughout the kingdom, it is even perhaps possible to go further and to consider that this category of soldiers could have managed and trained the inexperienced conscript troops, after these were mustered. One Umma text, at least, would seem to show it: OrSP 47-49, 466, where a series of breakdowns is made in the form:

N aga3-us2 / N egir-erin2 / nu-banda3 PN

“So many professional soldiers / so many following conscripts / (their) captain (being) PN.”

This document shows in any case a clear separation between the two categories of soldiers and we see in this case that there was on average one aga3-us2 for every four erin2 “following” him.[66]

§4.14. To conclude on this point, we can summarize the military organization of the Ur III kings according to the pattern described in figure 2.[67]

Figure 2: Men in Ur III service.

§4.15. At least two archival tablets may contradict the clear distinction that is proposed here between these two components of the royal army, with the conscripts (erin2) on one hand and the professional soldiers (aga3-us2) on the other. These are the only texts where the two terms are joined in the form erin2 aga3-us2, as if a single category:

AfO 18, 105, 3:	erin2 aga3-us2 lugal gar-ša-naki-ka-ke4 (MAH 16285; see below §7, text [R])
MTBM 234, 3:	ša3-gal erin2 aga3-us2

Two possibilities, not necessarily mutually exclusive, could explain such a situation. Either we have a simple case of juxtaposition, with the pooling of a joint force including both conscripts and professional soldiers (“conscripts troop and royal soldiers of Garšana” in the first example, “sustenance of conscripts and regular soldiers” in the second example); or all these men were conscripts (erin2), who were serving as soldiers (aga3-us2) during their term of service. This second explanation deserves consideration; in particular, it would help us understand a text as TÉL 182, which records “barley rations for regular soldiers from Nigin[68] during their time of service” (še-ba aga3-us2 dumu nigin6kibala gub-ba-še3). According to the description proposed above, the expression bala gub-ba (“on duty”) should apply only to the conscript troops of the erin2— who were alternating between time on and off duty—not to the professional aga3-us2 soldiers whose service was permanent. We must therefore acknowledge that conscripts (erin2) could fulfill their duty by serving as aga3-us2 soldiers.[69]

§4.16. The fifteen references where guruš and aga3-us2 are mentioned together in the single expression “guruš aga3-us2” pose no particular problem: they simply refer to men (guruš) hired or recruited as regular soldiers (aga3-us2).

§4.17. It should be noted that the texts display further parallels and alternations between the situation of the erin2 and that of the aga3-us2. For example, in Girsu administrative documentation, the category of the erin2 ma2-u4-zal-la (TCTI 2, 2747 or 3896) occurs in close parallel with that of the aga3-us2ma2-u4-zal-la (TCTI 2, 3205 or 4074). Here, the soldiers in question, whether conscripts or professionals, were probably those assigned to go and sail an official boat that was scheduled to leave Girsu every evening by the canals network of the land of Sumer.[70]

§4.18. Finally, two other important issues deserve further attention, as raised by allusions in a few texts: the recruitment of the aga3-us2, and the duration of their service. As will be seen, the aga3-us2were most often recruited on an individual basis.

§4.19. Two Girsu tablets (ITT 4, 7131 = MVN 6, 130, and CT 1, 4-5 94-10-15 4: ii 13) refer to the situation of some “royal soldiers seized among the shepherds” (aga3-us2 lugal sipa-ta dab5-ba-me). To this must be added a reference to some “soldiers (who are) fifteen young seized men” (aga3-us2 dumu-dab5-ba 15-bi, TSU 9 = TCS 1, 234). The impression that dominates in these three examples is that of recruitment of soldiers “by force”. The context would thus be conscription for a term of service (bala). This interpretation, however, is hindered by one Umma text, dated Š 47, which evokes the payment of bonuses to an individual, the day he joined the regular army as a soldier:

[I] YBC 15411

(1) 6 udu dba-ba6-mu (2) u4 nam-aga3-us2 i3-ni-in-ku4-ra

“6 sheep for Babamu, the day he entered the status of regular soldier.”

This text could refer to the voluntary enlistment of an individual in the standing army,[71] and the clear opposition observed in such situations would confirm (although the latter is, curiously, unique) the scheme proposed above, which distinguishes conscripts and volunteers.

§4.20. Two pieces of the Ur III administrative correspondence (letter orders) deal with the recruitment of soldiers and its consequences for the management of rations accounts. The first one, from Girsu, refers to the recruitment of former vintners:

[J] TCS 1, 86

(1) ka5-a-mu (2) u3-na-a-du11 (3) lu2-geštin-a (4) aga3-us2 ba-si-ga (5) siki-ba-bi ha-ba-ab-sum-mu (6) še-ba-a za3 ha-ab-us2-e

“Tell Ka’amu to give the(ir) wool rations to the vintners who have been made soldiers. (Tell) him to set aside the(ir) barley rations.”

A second similar letter, also from Girsu, uses the same Sumerian verb (sig) to evoke the transfer to the army of individuals and the payment of their rations:

[K] ITT 3, 5558 = TCS 1, 110

(1) lu2-kal-la-ra (2) u3-na-a-du11 (3) lu2 še-ba aga3-us2-lugal-ka ba-an-si-ga (4) mu didli-bi-še3 (5) siki-ba-bi (6) ha-ba-ab-sum-mu (7) ˹im˺ siki-ba ba-[ga2]-˹ga2˺ en3 ha-ab-tar-re

“Tell Lukalla to give the(ir) wool rations individually to those who get barley rations and have been made royal soldiers. (Tell) him to make certain that this is entered on the wool ration (account) tablet(s).”

It is hard to say here whether we are dealing with conscription for a term of obligatory service or with the recruitment of new professional soldiers, just hired.

§4.21. We must also mention one more Girsu text, which specifies that an individual recruited as a soldier must see his name registered on the original list tablets (im-ama = Akk. țuppāt ummātim):

[L] ITT 5, 6712

(1′) [ku?]-li (2′) al-la ra2-gaba i3-dab5 (3′) nam-aga3-us2-[še3] (4′) im-ama dah-he-dam

“Kuli, whom Alla the courier has taken in charge for (his integration with) the status of regular soldier, is to be added to the original record tablets.”

Thus, complete rolls listing the names of active soldiers and of the rations that were distributed to them were kept up to date very precisely, though unfortunately not one seems to have been discovered. In this context it is interesting to find in the tablets the title dub-sar aga3-us2, “scribe of the soldiers” (ITT4, 7467 = MVN 6, 443).

§4.22. Another Girsu text sheds light on the bookkeeping of such lists, with evidence for how a child had to be removed from the workforce list of a weaving workshop, when he was removed from his mother to become a soldier:

[M] ITT 5, 6795

(1) 1 ur-deš3-he-nun-ka (2) im-e tak4-a (3) dumu geme2-ki-gu-la uš-bar (3) aga3-us2 tur-še3 (4) inim lu2-inim-nig2-sa6-ga (5) ša3 gu2-ab-baki-ka (6) Date (IS 1)

“One (individual named) Ur-Ešhenunka, son of the weaver Geme-kigula, erased from the register, for (becoming) a child-soldier on the orders of Lu-inimnigšaga in the Gu’abba (province).”

Was this Lu-inimnigšaga the same one as the “captain” (nu-banda3) known by ITT 2, 651 (also “ša3gu2-ab-baki”)?

§4.23. The individual recruitment of a man is also recorded in two remarkably similar tablets from Umma. Each of them starts in the same way:

[N] SACT 2, 134, and YOS 4, 155

(1) 1 lu2-dsuen (2) aga3-us2 ensi2-ka-še3 (3) …

“One (individual named) Lu-Suen, (to serve) as soldier of the Governor.”

The first of these two texts records the recruitment of Lu-Suen in the 11th month of the year ŠS 1; the second in the 1st month of the year ŠS 6. The key issue here is whether or not this is the same individual in both tablets. If so—and it is an attractive hypothesis, given the parallelism of these two texts, which are also the only ones of this kind in all our documentation—Lu-Suen would have been hired for the first time in the year ŠS 1, then renewed in his duties a few years later. This could allow us to estimate the average duration for the initial term of service to be performed by a committed aga3-us2: four years, renewable?

§4.24. Finally, this assumption regarding the limited duration for a term of service could also help clarify the meaning of the Girsu tablet ITT 5, 6902, which mentions some aga3-us2-lugal šu-bar-ra-me, “released royal soldiers.” Quite a number of Ur III tablets refer to people who are “released” (šu bar-ra) from their obligations or from their deprivation of liberty, but this text is the only one that relates specifically to the aga3-us2. Was it after such a period of four years that the aga3-us2 were usually “released”? Or were the specific aga3-us2 of this example simply liberated after having spent time in jail? An answer to this question and new and interesting information are given by an unpublished tablet of Irisagrig: this text, to be published by D. I. Owen in his forthcoming volume Nisaba 15, shows that land allotments (GAN2) and rations (šuku) were attributed to these “soldiers after they have been released (from service)” (šu-bar-ra aga3-us2-me).

§4.25. Without further elaboration, let us finish this chapter by considering the categories of soldiers encountered in our archival texts that may be categorized according to their geographical origin. Two main groups are involved: Amorites (mar-du2) and Elamites (elam). For each of these groups we have clear and frequent references linking these “ethnic” categories with the aga3-us2 function (aga3-us2mar-du2, aga3-us2 elam, passim).[72] This identification is often on an individual basis, however, particularly in the messenger texts. Moreover, P. Michalowski has argued recently that “in the language of the Ur III administrative texts the word elam designates highlander bodyguards who were essentially the counterparts to ‘native’ aga3-us2 guardians.” These Elam aga3-us2 were “not directly employed by the Ur III state.” and “there is absolutely no evidence to support the notion that they were part of the Ur III military establishment.”[73] A similar or parallel phenomenon has been observed by W. Sallaberger concerning the mar-du2: he proposes not to identify them “by their homeland or language” and declares instead that “Mardu/Amorite came to mean also ‘nomad’ in Babylonia.”[74] In the case of the mar-du2, however, it must be kept in mind that the personal military guard nearest to the king himself was precisely composed of a dozen of these “Amorite” soldiers.[75]

§5. The chain of command

§5.1. It is the king who leads the army to war and is usually in command, at least virtually and in propaganda. This is notably suggested by the year names, the iconography and the royal inscriptions and hymns. Close to him, and at least during two decades (between AS 3 and IS 3), it is clear that the grand vizier (sukkal-mah) Arad-Nanna[76] played a particularly important role in the military life of the kingdom.

§5.2. The hierarchical organization within the army can be reconstructed quite clearly from numerous sources. There are three main ranks of officers above the basic soldier (aga3-us2):[77]

1)	The highest ranking officer is the šagina, “general.” Through the administrative archives, we know the career of some great generals from this period, such as Apillaša or Abuni, mentioned here in texts [F] and [Q]. One could therefore draw up biographical notes for a fairly large number of them. We will return to their role in the chapter concerning the territorial military organization (below §7).
2)	The middle ranking officers are the “captains” (nu-banda3). The number of men that a captain is likely to command in his unit can vary between a hundred and a few hundred.
3)	The junior officers are the ugula, “lieutenants.” Among them, particular categories can be distinguished: the ugula-geš2-da, “commander-of-sixty.” and the ugula-10, “commander-of-ten” / “Decurion.” The latter is some-times noted by the expression nam-10.

§5.3. All these officers, as seen in many texts, can command both aga3-us2 and erin2 units, of course. Here are three examples with aga3-us2:

Trouvaille 83, 13:	kal-bi-si aga3-us2 lu2-DUN-a a-bu-ni šagina “Kalbisi the soldier, subordinated to the General Abuni.”
MVN 5, 162, 5:	lu2-dba-ba6 nu-banda3 aga3-us2 “Lu-Baba, captain of the regular soldiers.”
TÉL 102, 13-14:	381 guruš aga3-us2 / ugula du-du “381 men, regular soldiers; (their) officer (is) Dudu.”

§5.4. Among the numerous tablets from Drehem that record withdrawals of animals “delivered to the kitchen for (feeding) the soldiers” (šu-gid2 e2-muhaldim mu aga3-us2-e-ne-še3),[78] a recently published tablet is particularly interesting. It describes for the first time in detail the full chain of command for the army, with the ultimate precision that all these soldiers had just returned from an expedition (text dated 22/vii/ŠS 1):

[O] Dahl and Hebenstreit 2007: 35-37 no. 1

(1) 3 gu4 255 udu (2) u4 21-kam (3) 90 udu (4) šu-gid2 e2-muhaldim-še3 (5) mu šagina nu-banda3 (6) u3 ugula-geš2-da kaskal-ta (7) er-ra-ne-še3 (…)

“3 oxen, 255 sheep on the 21st day, (and) 90 sheep, šugid-delivery to the kitchen, for the generals, the captains, and the ‘commanders-of-sixty’, who have returned from campaign.”

This tablet must be added to texts [C] and [D], seen above (§2.9-10). Here, only officers (šagina / nu-banda3 / ugula geš2-da) were the focus of the distribution; but the aga3-us2 soldiers, usually the main beneficiaries in such texts, were doubtless invited to the feast as well, if we judge by the quantity of meat obtained from the slaughter of three cattle and 345 sheep! If all that meat was consumed at once, it would have benefited as many as 22,500 men (or 11,250 men over two days),[79] which is considerable!

§5.5. Finally, it is worth noting that this chain of command (šagina / nu-banda3 / ugula) is exactly the one that is found in the Gilgameš and Akka tale. In a closing tribute to his vanquished enemy, king Gilgameš declares to Akka king of Kiš:[80]

[P] Gilgameš and Akka

(102) ak-ka3 ugula-gu10 ak-ka3 nu-banda3-gu10 (103) ak-ka3 šagina-erin2-na-gu10

“Akka my lieutenant, Akka my captain, Akka my general-in-command of the troops…”

§6. The weapons and equipment of war

§6.1. How was an ordinary soldier armed at that time? Along with the question of numbers, it is without doubt one of the most difficult issues we need to address. It warrants a systematic search of the archival texts in order to record all the names of weapons and to build up appropriate dossiers: gešKAK,gešban, geš-gid2, geštukul, gešilluru, geššukur, gir2, ha-zi-in, etc. We have already examined (above §3.4-5) some evidence on this subject that can be gleaned from the literary texts.

§6.2. Three categories of offensive weapons, however, appear with greater frequency in Ur III administrative archives and elsewhere and must therefore represent the basic weaponry of a soldier:

• The mace (geštukul),
• The spear (geš-gid2),
• And the bow (gešban).[81]

§6.3. It appears that the spear was the basic weapon for simple conscripts (erin2);[82] the bow would have been more readily used by professional soldiers (aga3-us2), who were in all likelihood trained regularly for its use (text [Q]). We saw above (§3.1. text [E]) how in the 20th year of his reign, Šulgi drafted a troop of spearmen at his capital of Ur. Such a military organization, based on these three categories of weapons, may be illustrated in the letter of Lipit-Eštar mentioned below (text [X]), which refers to the sending of troops to fight as reinforcements, composed in equal parts of spearmen (lu2geššukur), bowmen (lu2 gešban), and soldiers armed with battle-axes (lu2 dur10-tab-ba). If this three-party distribution was confirmed as general, it would provide at least a tenuous indication of how to think about the organization of the fighting army, as well as of how military strategy could have been considered and conducted.

Figure 3: Bow, mace and spear in fighting scenes of the Akkadian period (stela fragment from Girsu. Louvre Museum, AO 2876; from Abrahami and Battini 2008: p. 104).

§6.4. Who supplied the weapons? With regard to conscripts (erin2), we cannot be sure that it was always the central power. Professional soldiers (aga3-us2), in contrast, were certainly armed by the royal administration, as evidenced for example by this interesting text from Drehem, dated 2/xi/AS 2:

[Q] TIM 6, 34

(1) 1200 gešban (2) 1200 kušsag-e3 / gešban e2-ba-an (3) mu aga3-us2-e-ne-še3 (4) hu-ba-a (5) u3 a-pil-la-ša-ar (6) 1 za3-mi-ri2-tum zabar (7) geš-bi ku3-babbar šub-ba (8) ah-ba-bu mar-du2 (9) lu2-DUN-a a-bu-ni-ra (10) ugnim(=KI.SU.LU.UB2.GAR.RA)-še3 (11) bur-ma-ma nu-banda3 lu2 zimbirki-ke4 (12) u3 su2-ku-ku-um (13) lu2-DUN-a lugal-ku3-zu-ke4 (14) in-ne-de6-eš2 (15) ki di-ku5-mi-šar-ta / ba-zi (16) ša3 PU3.ŠA-iš-dda-gan (17-18) Date.

“1,200 bows and 1,200 leather quiver (for) pairs of bows, for the regular soldiers of Huba’a and Apillaša. A bronze javelin, the wooden (pole) of which plated with silver, for Ahbabu the Amorite, subordinated to Abuni; (all this) for the ready-to-go army. Burmama, the captain of the man of Sippar, and Sukkukum, subordinated to Lugal-kuzu, have provided (these weapons) to them; (they are) issued by Dayyanum-mišar.”[83]

What is described here is therefore the royal administration’s provision of a contingent of 1,200 regular soldiers employed as bowmen, with bows and quivers. Their officer, an Amorite,[84] received a ceremonial weapon, a javelin plated with silver. Otherwise, Huba’a, Apillaša and Abuni are three well-known generals (šagina) of the royal army in the archives from this period. We can even consider that this Apillaša is the same as the main protagonist in the letter CRU 1 mentioned above (§3.2, text [F]), where he is at the head of 10,000 aga3-us2 soldiers.

§6.5. How were these soldiers dressed? And how were they protected? The texts are not very loquacious on this topic, nor for all matters relating to defensive weapons. We must insist, to finish this short chapter, on the fact that the Ur III army was first and foremost an army of marching soldiers, even if the use of war-carts is not completely ruled out, despite its virtual absence in our archival texts.[85]

§7. Occupying the land: the garrisons

§7.1. In his pioneering article published some twenty years ago on the political and administrative organization of the Ur III Empire,[86] P. Steinkeller sketched a bipartite picture, distinguishing the “core” of the kingdom, composed of about twenty provinces that contributed to the system of centralized taxation called the bala,[87] from the “periphery.” with more or less controlled regions, held by garrisons under the authority of military governors (šagina) and subject to tribute (gun2 ma-da, see map, figure 1).

§7.2. As for these “marches” of the empire, P. Steinkeller highlighted a series of administrative texts from Drehem that show how garrisons and military personnel at the eastern and northeastern periphery of Sumer and Akkad had to generate annually, on behalf of the Sumerian central power, a fee counted in cattle and representing the “tribute (imposed on) the land” (gun2 ma-da) where they were stationed. These texts show clearly the military chain of command that we just described, now applied to garrisons: namely, the sequence “general”-šagina / “captain”-nu-banda3 / “lieutenant”-ugula / “troop soldier”-erin2. Each of these categories had to produce, according to rank, a greater or lesser number of livestock. P. Steinkeller counted nearly ninety of these Sumerian garrisons abroad, but we know nothing about their size, which would obviously have varied.[88]

§7.3. Within the empire, the twenty or so provinces were organized under two distinct hierarchies: one civilian, under the authority of a civil governor (ensik), and the other one military, under the authority of a general (šagina) who acted as military governor.[89] P. Steinkeller makes a crucial observation regarding the origin of these officials: while the civilian governors (ensik) of each province came mainly from local dynasties, deep in the heart of Sumer, it appears, however, that military governors (šagina) often bear Akkadian, Hurrian, or Elamite names, betraying their “foreign” origin. Moreover, the military governors were more “mobile” throughout their careers and closer, from many points of view, to the royal power.

§7.4. Each province of the kingdom therefore had appointed to it one or more military governor or general, according to the locations of garrisons and of troop mobilization. Completely independent from the ensik, these šagina reported directly to the central authorities, either the grand vizier (sukkal-mah) or the king himself. Their closeness and their loyalty to the king are highlighted by an important and interesting event (only known by a unique and, unfortunately, elusive administrative text of Drehem published recently) that took place at Ur sometime during the tenth month of Amar-Suen’s seventh regnal year: A number, or perhaps even all, of the generals (šagina) of the realm were gathered in the city to swear a loyalty oath to the king (Steinkeller 2008). Responsibility to recruit and maintain military forces in each province was probably entrusted to these šagina. Beyond this, however, it remains to know where these garrisons were located within the kingdom; this is truly a considerable problem, as they do not appear clearly in the archival texts.

§7.5. Thanks to the dossier of 800 or so Drehem texts related to the “kitchen” (e2-muhaldim), which register livestock intended to supply, among others, some number of aga3-us2 with meat,[90] we get a first impression that there were garrisons of aga3-us2, as one would expect, at least in Ur, Nippur and Uruk, that is to say in the three capitals (political, religious, and historical) of the kingdom. Some of the available texts actually specify the place where the soldiers were provided with meat: ša3 uri5ki-ma (Ur), ša3 nibruki (Nippur), and ša3 unuki (Uruk). It may nevertheless be better to conclude that these regular soldiers (aga3-us2), who were fed at Ur, Nippur, or Uruk via the e2-muhaldim of Drehem, actually represented the same royal guard of aga3-us2, moving regularly with the king to escort him during his journeys to all three capitals.[91] The same may apply to journeys to sanctuary-towns in the kingdom such as Gaeš, Idlurugu, and Tummal, which the king had to visit frequently, especially for regular attendance at the rituals (Akiti, etc.) that are mentioned in these texts.[92] One example of such ceremonies is the a-tu5-a-“lustration” ceremony, for which the king was actually accompanied by a particular group of his soldiers, the aga3-us2 a-tu5-a-me. Finally, this particular unit of aga3-us2provided through the Drehem e2-muhaldim can be understood as having represented a kind of Pretorian Guard at the king’s disposal, like the one that would be constituted by Roman Emperors. Following the calculations made by L. Allred from the quantities of delivered livestock,[93] this contingent of royal soldiers perhaps consisted of a few hundred men.[94]

§7.6. According to the Ur III documentation as a whole, however, beyond the three major cities, the provincial capitals, and the king’s royal guard, there were probably at least two other main garrisons of aga3-us2 soldiers in the core of the kingdom:[95]

1)

One in Nigin, a town south of the province of Lagaš.[96] At least six Girsu tablets mention “regular soldiers originating from Nigin” (aga3-us2 dumu nigin6ki-me, TUT 111; TÉL 182; Orient 16, 87 129; TLB 3, 148; Amherst 21; MVN 6, 443[97]). Nowhere else in the Ur III archival texts do we find such an expression in the form “aga3-us2 dumu GN”;[98] but unfortunately, we have no more evidence about this garrison.

2)

And especially another in Garšana. This site of Garšana[99] has reappeared in recent research through a batch of nearly 1,400 tablets in the Cornell University collections, recently published. As with so many Ur III texts without contexts, unfortunately, neither their exact origin nor their archaeological context may ever be known.[100] This archive likely refers to the management of a private domain which was placed under the authority of a man named Šu-Kabta, who was probably the husband of a royal princess named Simat-Ištaran, sister of king Šu-Suen. In this context, it is worth noting that Šu-Kabta appears in these texts as being a “general” (šagina).

§7.7. Apart from this important new archive, a small group of tablets is particularly interesting concerning Garšana: mainly from the administration of Girsu, they show that one of the principal garrisons of soldiers in the core of the kingdom was located precisely at Garšana. The “Lagashite” origin of these texts is interesting, as Garšana generally depended on the province and governor of Umma, as did Nagsu, Apisal, and Zabalam, for example.[101] The tell of Garšana, which has not yet been identified, may have been located at the crossroads of the central provinces of Umma, Girsu and Uruk, and therefore south of Umma, perhaps in the area of Gu’edena.[102] This file comprises the following six texts (in chronological order):

[R] AfO 18, 105, MAH 16285 (=CUSAS 3, 1440). Date: AS 9 (Drehem)

(1) 570 kušsuhub2 e2-ba-an (2) ki ensi2 gir2-suki-ta (3) erin2 aga3-us2 lugal gar-ša-naki-ka-ke4 (rev. 4) šu ba-ab-ti (5) nu-banda2 e-lu2-da-an (6) ša3 unuki (7) giri3 lugal-am-gal (8) Date.

“The troop of royal soldiers of Garšana received 570 pairs of leather boots issued by the governor of Girsu. The(ir) captain (is) Elu-dan. At Uruk, through Lugal-amgal.”

[S] TÉL 171 (=CUSAS 3, 1447). Date: ix/ŠS 6 (Girsu)

(1) 438 še (2) gur lugal (3) nig2-ba lugal (4) aga3-us2 ša3 gar-ša-na (5) ki al-la-mu-ta (rev. 6) šu-i3-li2 (7) šu ba-ti (8) i2-dub geštir-ma-nu-ta (9) še ur-šu-ga-lam-ma (10-11) Date.

“131,400 liters of barley according to the royal measure, royal gift from the king (to) the soldiers at Garšana. šu-ilī has received (it) from Allamu, from the Tirmanu warehouse. Barley (run by) Ur-šugalama.”

[T] ITT 3, 6174 (=CUSAS 3, 1453). Date: xii/ŠS 9 (Girsu)

(1) 3000 kuš udu a-gar gu7-a (2) 600 kuš udu a-gar nu gu7-a (rev. 3) ki nig2-u2-rum-ta (4) mu aga3-us2 gar-ša-an-naki-še3 (5) i-pa2-li2-is-e (6) šu ba-ti (7) Date.

“Ippalis received 3,000 tanned sheep skins (and) 600 non-tanned sheep skins, delivered by Nigurum for the soldiers of Garšana.”

[U] ITT 3, 5405 (=CUSAS 3, 1491). Date: IS 2 (Girsu). Collated by the author [*] at the Archaeological Istanbul Museum[103]

(1) 1897 še gur (2) aga3*-us2* gar-ša-na-ke4 (3) šu ba-ab-ti (4) ki ensi2 gir2*-su*ki*-ta (rev. 5) ba-zi (6) kišib3 sukkal-mah (7) Date. “569,100 liters of barley, received by the soldiers of Garšana. Expense by the governor of Girsu. Seal of the grand vizier.”

[V] MVN 6, 280 (=CUSAS 3, 1459) (Girsu)

… (14) 20 gu2 siki (15) aga3-us2 dumu gar-ša-an-naki-me (16) kišib3 sukkal-mah ra-ra-dam (17) …

“20 talents of wool for the soldiers originating from Garšana. The seal of the grand vizier has to be rolled (on the tablet).”

[W] TCTI 2, 3543 (=CUSAS 3, 1458). undated (Girsu)

(1) 360 erin2 <nu-banda3> lu2-ša-lim (2) 500 nu-banda3 la-num2 (3) 360 nu-banda3 šu-i3-li2 (4) 147 nu-banda3 PU3.ŠA-ha-mi (5) erin2 gar-ša-an-naki(6) …

“360 men of the troop: the(ir) captain (is) Lu-šalim. 500: the(ir) captain (is) Lanum. 300: the(ir) captain (is) Šu-ili. 147: the(ir) captain (is) Puzur-Hammi. (These are) men of the troop of Garšana.”

We must add to this list texts that mention a “general” (šagina) of Garšana, on an Umma tablet (SAT 3,2073) and in the Garšana archive (CUSAS 3, 1424, and seal impression of Šu-Kabta, CUSAS 3, p. 436).

§7.8. Despite its disparate character, we must emphasize the exceptional nature of this small dossier.[104] It has no equivalent elsewhere in the Ur III documentation, and it shows how these soldiers, who do truly appear to belong to a garrison at Garšana, were regularly supplied: 570 pairs of boots (text [R]), 3,600 sheep skins (text [T]), 600 kg wool (text [V]), 130,000 and then 570,000 liters of barley (texts [S] and [U]). These texts on the garrison of Garšana come from Drehem, Girsu, and Umma; they refer to Uruk, Girsu, and to the grand vizier (sukkal-mah), whose importance in the military affairs of the kingdom is well known and whose official titles show his ties to Garšana (RIME3/2.1.4.13, p. 324). All this suggests that, in a central position within the kingdom, there was a key garrison of regular soldiers maintained by the Neo-Sumerian state (text [R] asserts that they were “soldiers of the king”). Further, it is not impossible to imagine that the general who commanded this garrison was precisely, at least for some time, Šu-Kabta, the man whose private archives were found, along with those of his wife.[105]

§7.9. The last tablet of this small dossier, text [W], provides useful evidence for the composition of units stationed in the garrison of Garšana, the whole dossier having shown that it consisted of both conscript troops (erin2) and professional soldiers (aga3-us2). Each of these units was commanded by a captain (nu-banda3) and included between 150 and 500 men. Also, we learn that the total number of troops identified in the Garšana garrison could reach 1,367 men (erin2).

§7.10. The rest of text [W], however interesting and unusual, is more difficult: it seems to break down the assignment of troops actually identified in several other places in the kingdom, as opposed to the personnel who had been originally anticipated.[106] The scribe eventually recorded a total deficit of 340 men from the 3,000 he had hoped to muster at an initial meeting, or approximately 10% missing the call.

§8. The issue of numbers

§8.1. Text [W] offers a perfect transition to address one final point in this study. Albeit important, it is difficult to analyze, due to lack of adequate evidence: this is the question of numbers or force. If one accepts that the garrison of Garšana constituted a major barracks for the whole kingdom, the 1,300 troops (erin2) stationed there (text [W]) did not, in the final analysis, represent a very considerable number! We must nevertheless acknowledge that when units of soldiers, whether aga3-us2 or erin2, appear in our archives, they rarely consist of more than a few hundred men. It is rare to encounter groups of more than 1,000 soldiers in a military context. This contrasts with the large and exceptional mobilizations of labor during harvests, when up to 10,000 aga3-us2 may be gathered (see above §4.7, in ASJ 8, 118 33).

§8.2. In the absence of any explicit evidence, one possible method to reconstruct a more significant number of men gathered for some military occasion, such as departure to or return from campaign, is to take into account the texts recording distribution of food or drink to the soldiers, and to collect the quantities distributed and consumed. The problem in this case is that the duration of consumption is rarely mentioned: is the food or drink for one day, ten days or a hundred days? In documents relating to the army, distributions made in the framework of “banquets” to celebrate victory must take place at one time and therefore allow the following results:

• Text [C], Drehem: 155 head of cattle to feed the soldiers returning = 9,000 men (or 4,500 on two days, 3,000 on three days, etc.)?
• Text [D], Umma: 1,200 liters of beer for quenching the thirst of soldiers returning from expedition = 600 men?
• Text [O], Drehem: 3 cattle and 345 sheep to feed the soldiers returning from expedition = 22,500 men (or 11,250 on two days, 7,500 on three days, etc.)?
• Texts in the dossier concerning the naptanum-banquet at Umma:[107] between 760 and 1,200 soldiers, beneficiaries of beer?
• UET 3, 1114, Ur: 1,450 liters of regular beer and 1,500 liters of bread and flour, shared (ha-la-a) between soldiers (aga3-us2) = 750 men?
• TUT 120, Girsu: 44,500 liters of beer on each day of a full month (for this text, and this is exceptional, the duration of consumption is therefore known), shared by soldiers (aga3-us2-e ha-la-a) = 750 men.
• STA 3 iii 7-8, Umma: 37,710 liters of beer delivered to the soldiers in the frame of the monthly bala duties = 628 men?
• Dossier of the Drehem e2-muhaldim (above §7.5): one contingent of several hundred soldiers acting as royal guard.
• Three typical Girsu texts (among others) record a še-ba delivery to the aga3-us2 for the 11th month of Š 46 (MVN 12, 118 and CM 26, 64) and the 11th month of Š 47 (MVN 12, 249). If we calculate 2 liters per day and per soldier during one month, we get: 1,950 soldiers in the first text (with 117,035 liters of barley), 2,023 soldiers in the second text (121,390 liters of barley) and 6,095 soldiers in the third text (365,710 liters of barley). But is this way of calculating reliable? And who are these Girsu aga3-us2?
• Text [Q], Drehem: 1,200 bows distributed to arm 1,200 soldiers.
• Text [R], Drehem: 570 pairs of boots to put shoes on 570 soldiers.
• Text [W], Girsu: 1,300 men in the garrison of Garšana.
• TCTI 2, 3543 (remainder of the text [W]): breakdown of units between 360 and 820 men.

§8.3. In most cases and if we put aside the (exceptional) texts [C] and [O], we find that the sources indicate a range of unit size from 300 to 2,000 soldiers, with an average of around 600.[108] It may be objected that nothing is said here about the army composed of erin2-conscripts, when these were mustered en masse for military operations: adding these conscripts to the professional soldiers, the numbers would probably be much larger. But the problem is that they are hardly ever seen in our archives (see nevertheless below §8.6)!

§8.4. One more interesting account related to this issue is provided by an extract of the “historical” letter (its status is therefore literary) from Lipit-Eštar to Nanna-kiag, referring to the constitution and sending of a reinforcement army composed of three equal units of spearmen, bowmen, and soldiers armed with axes; the total reaches 6,000 men:

[X] Letter from Lipit-Eštar to Nanna-kiag (ETCSL 3.2.4)

(8) a2-še3 2 li-mu-um erin2 lu2 geššukur (9) 2 li-mu-um erin2 lu2 gešban (10) 2 li-mu-um erin2 lu2 dur10-tab-ba im-mu-e-ši-sar

“Now, I have sent to you in haste 2,000 spearmen troops, 2,000 bowmen troops, 2,000 double-axe wielding troops.”

The most interesting information here is the three-party distribution of the whole group (see above §6.2-3). For the rest, the total number of 3 × 2,000 = 6,000 is unfortunately not reliable, as demonstrated by the alternative numbers given by some copies of this text: for each unit, they alternate numbers between 2,000, 3,000 or 4,000 men.

§8.5. Regarding the reliability of numbers, the situation is probably similar for the one text that gives the largest number of soldiers explicitly attested in a military context, for all the documents we have seen for this period: the 10,000 aga3-us2 (2 × 5,000) commanded by Apillaša (text [F] above §3.2). Again, it must be kept in mind that this document from the royal correspondence of Ur is not an administrative tablet but a literary text. And even if an original letter was actually written by Aradmu, we cannot know how much reality resides in this breakdown of 10,000 regular soldiers: we have to consider the possibility that the author of the letter sought to impress his interlocutor, or that the scribes who “canonized” or “re-created” this letter may have rounded off the total number of soldiers, either to exaggerate or to minimize it.

§8.6. Finally, armies of several tens of thousands, as seen in documentation from the time of the Mari kings or from that of the neo-Assyrian empire, cannot in any case be seen explicitly in our Ur III texts. Therefore, we do not know ultimately with what means the kings of Ur were engaged in all these faraway fights that they undertook, as mentioned at the beginning of this work. Nevertheless, P. Michalowski recently pointed out a great number of erin2 troops stationed in Susiana, which can perhaps be glimpsed from administrative tablets dating to Šulgi’s final years. At that time, several tens of thousands troops (erin2) seem to have been stationed in such cities as Susa or AdamDUN. These cities could have thus been staging areas, virtually dominated by military personnel ready to go to war. And, according to Michalowski, “massive armies” were gathered there during the wars of Šulgi’s final years, this influx of soldiers having perhaps doubled the population of Susiana at that time: “some of these troops come from Sumer, some were local, and some came from other vassals, allies and provinces.” Ultimately and according to him, “the impact of a large military presence in the border areas should not be underestimated.”[109]

§8.7. Nothing is available for the army on campaign, nor on siege warfare (unlike the situation for the time of the Mari kings for example), or on military strategy. These are still questions for which the silence of our sources, because of their nature, is unfortunately almost absolute.[110]

§9. Conclusion

In reinforcing the institution of the aga3-us2 soldiers, already observable since the Pre-Sargonic period, the kings of Ur wished to have at their disposal, first, a force for administering and securing the territory of the kingdom, and second, a military intervention force ready for foreign conquest. Closest to the king, a specific contingent of royal aga3-us2 soldiers was used as his own household troops and elite infantry unit, as a kind of Pretorian Guard. For this Ur III period, the texts from the Girsu archives generally provide the greatest amount of evidence regarding the army and military affairs. If we are not misled by the random distribution of our sources and in particular by the fact that we do not have any central archive, it appears that this province of Girsu played a military role in the kingdom greater than that of its neighbors. And we must note in conclusion that the elements we have tried to gather and to describe briefly approximate a framework inherited from the Old-Akkadian period, one that would continue to be used in Mesopotamia until the end of the Old-Babylonian period, at least with regard to the constitution and hierarchical organization of the royal army.[111]

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	forthcoming	“Court Officials at Umma.” In Proceedings of the 53rd RAI, Moscow and St. Petersburg 2007.
Owen, David I.
	1973	“Miscellanea Neo-Sumerica I-III.” In H. A. Hoffner, ed., Orient and Occident. Essays Presented to Cyrus H. Gordon on the Occasion of his Sixty fifth Birthday. AOAT 22. Neukirchen-Vluyn, Neukirchener Verlag, pp. 351-355.
	1993	“Syrians in Sumerian Sources from the Ur III Period.” In M. C. Chavalas and John L. Hayes (eds.), New Horizons in the Study of Ancient Syria. Bibliotheca Mesopotamica 25. Malibu: Undena, pp. 107-175.
Owen, David I. and Mayr, Rudi
	2007	The Garšana Archives. CUSAS 3. Bethesda, MD: CDL Press.
Postgate, J. Nicholas
	2004	“Pfeil und Bogen.” RlA 10, 456-458.
Sallaberger, Walther
	1993	Der Kultische Kalender der Ur III-Zeit. UAVA 7/1-2. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter.
	1999	“Ur III-Zeit.” In P. Attinger and M. Wäfler, eds., Mesopotamien, Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit. OBO 160/3. Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, pp. 121-390.
	2007	“From Urban Culture to Nomadism : A History of Upper Mesopotamia in the Late Third Millennium.” In C. Marro and C. Kuzucuoglu, eds., Sociétés humaines et Changement climatique à la fin du Troisième millénaire : Une crise a-t-elle eu lieu en Haute Mésopotamie. Varia Anatolica 19. Istanbul & Paris: De Boccard, pp. 417-456.
Shaffer, Aaron, Wasserman, Nathan, and Seidl, Ursula.
	2003	“Iddi(n)-Sîn, King of Simurrum.” ZA 93, 1-52.
Sharlach, Tonia
	2004	Provincial Taxation and the Ur III State. CM 26. Leiden: Brill/Styx.
Sigrist, Marcel
	1979	“Le trésor de Dréhem.” OrNS 48, 26-53.
	1980	“ERÍN – UN-ÍL.” RA 74, 11-28.
	1986	“Les courriers de Lagash.” In L. De Meyer, H. Gasche and F. Vallat (eds.), Fragmenta Historiae Elamicae: Mélanges offerts à M. J. Steve. Paris: Éditions Recherche sur les Civilisations, pp. 51-63.
Sollberger, Edmund
	1958	“Garašana(k).” AfO 18, 104-108.
Steinkeller, Piotr
	1982	“On Editing Ur III Economic Texts.” JAOS 102, 639-644.
	1990	“More on LÚ.SU(.A)=Šimaški.” NABU 1990/13.
	1991	“The Administrative and Economic Organization of the Ur III State: the Core and the Periphery.” In Mc G. Gibson and R. Biggs, eds., The Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient Near East, SAOC 46. 2nd edition. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 15-34.
	2003	“Archival Practices at Babylonia in the Third Millennium.” In M. Brosius, ed., Ancient Archives and Archival Traditions: Concepts of Record-Keeping in the Ancient World, Oxford Studies in Ancient Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-58.
	2007a	“New Light on Šimaški and Its Rulers.” ZA 97, 215-232.
	2007b	“City and Countryside in Third-Millennium Southern Babylonia.” In E. Stone, ed.,Settlement and Society. Essays dedicated to Robert McCormick Adams. Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology at UCLA, pp. 185-211.
	2008	“Joys of Cooking in Ur III Babylonia.” In P. Michalowski, ed., On the Third Dynasty of Ur: Studies in Honor of Marcel Sigrist. JCS SS 1. Boston: ASOR, pp. 185-192.
Studevent-Hickman, Benjamin
	2008	“The Workforce at Umma: Some New Questions.” In S. Garfinkle and C. Johnson, eds., The Growth of an Early State in Mesopotamia: Studies in Ur III Administration. BPOA 5. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, pp. 141-147.
Stol, Martin
	2004	“Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Altbabylonischer Zeit.” In P. Attinger and M. Wäfler, eds., Mesopotamien. Die altbabylonische Zeit. OBO 160/4. Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, pp. 643-975.
Suter, Claudia
	2000	Gudea’s Temple Building. The Representation of an Early Mesopotamian Ruler in Text and Image. CM 17, Groningen: Styx Publications.
Vallat, François (with Marie-Joseph Steve and Hermann Gasche)
	2002	“Suse.” Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible XIII/73. Paris: Letouzey & Ané, cols. 359-511.
Westenholz, Åke
	1999	“The Old Akkadian Period: History and Culture.” In P. Attinger and M. Wäfler, eds.,Mesopotamien, Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit. OBO 160/3. Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, pp. 17-117.
Widell, Magnus
	2003	“Reconstructing the Early History of the Ur III State: Some Methodological Considerations of the Use of Year Formulae.” JAC 18, 99-111.

Soldier’s Lives – Sumer and Akkad 3500BC to 2200BC

 

SUMER AND AKKAD

Modern Iraq is the site of ancient Sumer and Akkad, two city-states that produced the most sophisticated armies of the Early Bronze Age. The Greeks called the area Mesopotamia, literally, “the land between the two rivers,” a reference to the Tigris and Euphrates valley. In the Bible the area is called Shumer, the original Sumerian word for the southern part of Iraq, the site of Sumer itself and its capital of Ur.

It was in ancient Sumer that the first detailed records of military campaigns written on clay or carved in stone appeared. No society of the Early and Middle Bronze ages was more advanced in the design and application of military technology and technique than Sumer, a legacy it sustained for 2,000 years before bequeathing it to the rest of the Near East. The period of interest for the military historian seeking to understand the evolution of ancient armies is the period from 3000 to 2334 BCE, the date that Sargon the Great united all of Sumer into a single state and changed its governmental and military organization.

The almost constant warfare among the Sumerian city-states for 2,000 years spurred the development of military technology and technique far beyond any similar development found elsewhere in the Near East at that time. The first Sumerian war for which there is detailed evidence occurred between the states of Lagash and Ummain 2525 BCE. In this conflict Eannatum of Lagash defeated the king of Umma. The importance of this war to the military historian lies in a commemorative stele that Eannatum erected to celebrate his victory.

This stele is called the “Stele of Vultures” for its portrayal of birds of prey and lions tearing at the flesh of the corpses as they lay on the desert plain. The stele represents the first important pictorial portrayal of war in the Sumerian period and portrays the king of Lagash leading an infantry phalanx of armored, helmeted warriors, armed with spears as they trample their enemies underfoot. The king, with a socket axe in hand, rides in a chariot drawn by four onagers (wild asses). In a lower panel Eannatum holds a sickle sword.

Area of Sumerian Influence

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ORGANIZATION OF SUMERIAN TROOPS

The stele indicates that Sumerian troops fought in phalanx formation, organized six files deep with an eight-man front, a formation similar to that used later in Archaic Greece. The Sumerians used both the decimal and sexagesimal system based on multiples of six (they were the first to divide an hour into sixty minutes), and most probably, the organization of the army was based on multiples of 6, 60, 120, and so on. Fighting in phalanx required discipline and training, permitting the conclusion that the soldiers portrayed on the stele were probably professionals. Another indication is the presence of titles associated with military command.

Even in times of peace, temple estate employees we reorganized into groups commanded or supervised by ugula ( commanders), and nu.banda (captains). The Sumerians seemed to have kept the same organization used for corvée labor for use in the military. The word for both laborers and soldiers was erin, which originally meant yoke or neck stock, perhaps implying the nature of such service. Other explicitly military titles were shub.lugal, or “king’s retainer,” and aga.ush, which literally means “follower.”

The aga.ush were really erin who regularly served as soldiers rather than as laborers in fulfilling their obligations as royal or temple tenants. Military units were of regular size and were designated by the rank of their commander with a numerical suffix indicating size. Thus ugala.nam10 meant a unit of ten run by a commander. The Stele of Vultures seems to provide evidence of the world’s first standing professional army.

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OUTFITTING THE TROOPS: ARMOR, TRANSPORT, AND WEAPONS

The first evidence of soldiers wearing helmets is also provided on the stele. From the bodies of soldiers found in the Death Pits of Ur dating from 2500 BCE. we know that these helmets were made of copper and probably were worn with a leather cap underneath. Since bronze manufacturing technology was already known in Sumer at this time, the use of copper to make helmets remains a mystery. The appearance of the helmet marks the first defensive response to the killing power of an important offensive weapon: the mace. In Sumer the use of a well-crafted helmet indicates a major development in military technology which was so effective that it drove the mace from the battlefield.

The first representation of the military application of the wheel is depicted on the stele and shows Eannatum riding in a chariot. The Sumerian invention of the chariot has to be ranked among the major military innovations in history, although its true exploitation as a vehicle of war had to await the Mitanni.

The Sumerian chariot was usually a four wheeled vehicle, although there are examples of the two-wheeled variety in other records. It carried a crew of two and required four onagers to pull it. The Sumerian “chariot” is more accurately called a “battle car” since it lacked many of the refinements that later made it an effective fighting vehicle. Sumerians also used the “straddle car,” a cabless platform pulled by onagers where the driver maintained his balance by straddling the car. One text indicates that the ruler of the state of Umma had an elite unit comprising sixty vehicles. This is the only evidence we have of the number of battle cars that could be mustered by one state. But even if each state could field only sixty such vehicles, a powerful ruler, such as Lugalzagesi, who controlled all southern Sumer, could field over 600 battle cars in a major engagement by drawing on his vassal states.

The Sumerians can also be credited with inventing the rein ring for use with the chariot in order to provide the driver some control over the onagers. At this early stage of its development, however, the chariot probably would not have been a major offensive weapon because of its size, weight, instability, and lack of manoeuvrability. The placement of the axle in the middle or front of the carrying platform made the vehicle heavy and unstable at speed. In all likelihood it was not produced for war in quantity, and its use was limited to high-ranking nobles in the king’s household.

Sumerian charioteers were armed with javelins and axes, and the absence of the bow in early Sumerian warfare suggests that the chariot was used to deliver shock to opposing infantry formations. In this role the chariot was used as transport for mounted heavy infantry. The Sumerian chariot remained the prototype for Near Eastern armies for almost 1,000 years. In the eighteenth century BCE, various Mesopotamian states introduced the horse-drawn chariot, a development that greatly increased the vehicle’s military capability. At the same time the appearance of the bit improved manoeuvrability and control of the animal teams at higher speeds. Over time, the drivers, shield bearers, archers, and spearmen carried into battle by chariots became the elite fighting corps of the ancient world.

The lower palette of the Stele of Vultures shows the king holding a sickle sword, the weapon that became the primary infantry weapon of the Egyptian and biblical armies at a much later date. The version that appears on the stele was much shorter than the version that evolved later and appears very much like an agricultural sickle, which could well have been the prototype for the weapon. The sickle sword appears on two other independent renderings of the period, suggesting strongly that it was the Sumerians who invented this important weapon sometime around 2500 BCE.

The stele also shows Eannatum’s soldiers wearing armored cloaks. Each soldier’s cloak is secured around the neck and may have been made of wool cloth or, more probably, thin leather. At various places on the cloak were sewn metal disks with raised centres or spines, like the boss on a shield. It is not possible to determine if these disks were made from copper or bronze, but a spined plate of bronze was certainly within the capacity of Sumerian metal technology. Although somewhat primitive in application, the cloak on the stele is the first representation of body armor in history. Other surviving archaeological sources show portrayals of important military innovations appearing for the first time in ancient Sumer.

The king of Ur, for example, appears on a carved conch plate armed with a socket axe. The development of the bronze socket axe remains one of Sumer’s major military innovations. The use of the cast bronze axe socket that slipped over the end of the shaft and was affixed with rivets permitted a much stronger attachment of the blade to the shaft. It is likely that the need for a stronger axe arose in response to the development of body armor that made the cutting axe less effective.

The portrayals of Sumerian axes by2500 BCE clearly show a change in design. The most significant change was a narrowing of the blade itself to reduce the impact area and to bring the blade to more of a point to concentrate the force of the blow. This development marks the appearance of the penetrating axe, whose narrow blade and strong socket made it capable of piercing bronze plate armor. The result was one of the most devastating weapons of the ancient world, a weapon that remained in use for 2,000 years.

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SUMERIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Sophisticated weaponry and tactics require some form of larger social organization and impetus to give them shape and direction if they are to be effective in war. We know very little about the military organization of Sumer in the third millennium BCE. We can judge from the Tablets of Shuruppak that the typical Sumerian city-state of this period comprised about 1,800 square miles in area, including its lands and fields. This area could sustain a population of between 30,000 and 35,000 people.

The tablets record a force of between 600 and 700 soldiers serving as the king’s bodyguard, the corps of a professional army, but a population of this size could easily support an army of regular and reserve forces of between 4,000 and 5,000 men at full mobilization. It is highly likely that some form of military conscription existed, at least during times of emergency. Two hundred years after Eannatum’s death, King Lugalzagasi of Umma succeeded in establishing his influence over all Sumer, although there is no evidence that he introduced any significant changes.

Twenty-four years later, the empire of Lugalzagasi was destroyed by the armies of a Semitic prince from the northern city of Akkad, Sargon the Great (2325–? BCE). All Sumer was now united under the control of the Akkadian king. Sargon bequeathed to the world the prototype of the military dictatorship. By force of arms Sargon conquered all the Sumerian city-states and the entire Tigris-Euphrates valley, bringing into being an empire that stretched from the Taurus Mountains to the Persian Gulf and, perhaps, even to the Mediterranean. In his fifty-year reign Sargon fought no fewer than thirty-four wars. One account suggests that his army numbered 5,400 men, soldiers called gurush in Akkadian. If that account is correct, Sargon’s army would have been the largest standing army of the period. That Sargon’s army would have been composed of professionals seems obvious in light of the almost constant state of war that characterized his reign.

As in Sumer, military units appear to have been organized on the sexagesimal system. Sargon’s army comprised nine battalions of 600 men, each commanded by a gir.nita, or “colonel.”Other ranks of officer included the pa.pa/shakhattim, literally, “he of two staffs of office,” a title which indicated that this officer commanded two or more units of sixty.

Below this rank were the nu.banda and ugala, ranks unchanged since Sumerian times. Even if they had begun as conscripts, within a short time Sargon’s soldiers would have become battle-experienced veterans. Equipping an army of this size required a high degree of military organization to run the weapons and logistics functions, to say nothing of the routine administration that was characteristic of a literate people who kept prodigious records. We know nothing definitive about these arrangements.

An Akkadian innovation introduced by Sargon was the niskum, a class of soldiers probably equivalent to the old aga-ush lugai, or “royal soldiers.” The niskum held plots of land by favor of the king and received allotments of fish and salt every three months. The idea was to create a corps of loyal military professionals along the later model of Republican Rome. Thutmose I of Egypt, too, introduced a similar system as a way of producing a caste of families who held their land as long as they continued to provide a son for the officer corps. The Akkadian system worked to provide significant numbers of loyal, trained soldiers who could be used in war or to suppress local revolts. Along with the professionals, militia, and these royal soldiers, the army of Sargon contained light troops or skirmishers called nim soldiers. Nim literally means “flies,” a name which suggests the employment of these troops in spread formation accompanied by rapid movement.

During the Sargon period the Sumerians/Akkadians contributed yet another major innovation in weaponry: the composite bow. The introduction of this lethal and revolutionary weapon may have occurred during the reign of Naram Sin (2254–2218 BCE), Sargon’s grandson. Like his grandfather, Naram Sin fought continuous wars of conquest against foreign enemies. His victory over Lullubi is commemorated in a rock sculpture that shows Naram Sin armed with a composite bow. This sculpture marks the first appearance of the composite bow in history and strongly suggests that it was of Sumerian/Akkadian origin.

The fact that the bow appears in the hand of the warrior king himself suggests that it was a major weapon of the time, even though there is no surviving evidence that the Sumerian army had previously used even the simple bow. The composite bow was a major military innovation. While the simple bow could kill at ranges from 50 to 100 yards, it would not penetrate even simple leather armor at these ranges.

The composite bow, with a pull of at least twice that of the simple bow, could easily penetrate leather armor and, perhaps, even the early prototypes of bronze armor that were emerging at this time. In the hands of even untrained peasant militia the composite bow could bring the enemy under a hail of arrows from twice the distance of the simple bow. So important was this weapon that it became a basic implement of war of all armies of the Near East for the next 1,500 years. The use of battle cars seems to have declined considerably during the Akkadian period. Any number of reasons suggest themselves. Such vehicles were very expensive. In Sumer a powerful king could commandeer the cars of his vassals, which they maintained at their expense. But with the centralization of political authority under Sargon these vassals disappeared, making the cost of these cars a royal expense.

The professionalization of the army resulted in an infantry-heavy force which under most circumstances would have required few battle cars beyond those needed to transport the king and his generals. Finally, the Akkadian kings fought wars far from home in the mountains of Elam and against the Guti farther north. These were lightly armed, highly mobile enemies fighting in mountains and heavily wooded glens. The chariot had come into being to fight wars between rival city-states on relatively even terrain. Their use in rough terrain at considerable distances from home probably revealed the battle car’s obvious deficiencies under these conditions, leading to a decline in its military usefulness. They seem to have remained in use by couriers and messengers at least within the imperial borders, where they travelled regular routes known as chariot roads.

FURTHER READING

Charvát, Peter. Mesopotamia Before History. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.

Ferrill, Arther. The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1985.

Gabriel, Richard A., and Karen S. Metz. From Sumer to Rome: The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Kramer, Samuel N. The Sumerians: Their History, Culture, and Character. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Littauer, M. A., and J. H. Crouwell. Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the Ancient Near East. Leiden: Brill, 1979.

Mellaart, James. The Neolithic of the Near East. New York: Charles Scribner, 1975.

Nissen, Hans Jörg. The Early History of the Ancient Near East, 9000 to 2000 b.c. .Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Oakeshott, R. Ewart. The Archaeology of Weapons. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Oppenheim, A. Leo. Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Pollock, Susan. Ancient Mesopotamia: The Eden That Never Was. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

Saggs, H.W.F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984.

Wenke, Robert J. Patterns of Prehistory: Man’s First Three Million Years. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Yadin, Yigael. The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Study. 2vols. Translated by M. Pearlman. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

The Armies of Sumer and Akkad, 3500 to 2200 BC

The area of present-day Iraq is the site of ancient Sumer and Akkad, two city-states that produced the most sophisticated armies of the Bronze Age. The Greeks called the area Mesopotamia, literally the “land between the two rivers,” a reference to the Tigris and Euphrates basin. In the Bible, the area is called Shumer , the original Sumerian word for the southern part of Iraq, the site of Sumer with its capital at the city of Ur. If the river is followed northward from Sumer for about 200 miles, the site of ancient Akkad can be found.

From here, in 2300 B.C., Sargon the Great launched a campaign of military conquest that united all of Mesopotamia. Within a decade Sargon had extended his conquests from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and northeastward to the Taurus Mountains of Turkey. Sargon the Great provided the world with its first example of a military dictatorship.

Sumerian civilization was among the oldest urban civilizations on the planet. In Sumer the first attempts at writing emerged to produce ancient cuneiform, a form of administrative language written as wedged strokes on clay tablets. And in ancient Sumer thefirst detailed records, written or carved in stone, of military battles appeared. No society of the Bronze Age was more advanced in the design and application of military weaponry and technique than was ancient Sumer, a legacy it sustained for two thousand years before bequeathing it to the rest of the Middle East.

The cities of Sumer, first evident in 4000 B.C., provide the world’s first examples of genuine urban centers of considerable size. In these early cities, especially in Eridu and Urak, people first manifested the high degree of cooperative effort necessary to make urban life possible. Both cities reflected the evidence of this cooperation in the dikes, walls, irrigation canals, and temples which date from the fourth millennium.

An efficient agricultural system made it possible to free large numbers of people from the land, and the cities of ancient Sumer produced social structures comprised largely of freemen who met in concert to govern themselves. The early Sumerian cities were characterized by a high degree of social and economic diversity, which gave rise to artisans, merchants, priests, bureaucrats and, for the first time in history, professional soldiers. The ancient Sumerians were a polyglot of ethnic peoples, much like in the United States.

The period of interest for the student of military history is that from 3000 to 2316 B.C., the date that Sargon the Great united all of Sumer into a single state. This period was marked by almost constant wars among the major city-states and against foreign enemies. Among the more common foreign enemies of the southern city-states were the Elamites, the peoples of northern Iran. The conflict between Sumerians and Elamites probably extended back to Neolithic times, but the first recorded instance of war between them appeared in 2700 B.C., when Mebaragesi, the first king on the Sumerian King List, undertook a war against the Elamites, and “carried away as spoil the weapons of Elam.” This first “Iran-Iraq war” was fought in the same area around Basra and the salt marshes that have witnessed the modern conflict of the last decade between the same two states.

The almost constant occurrence of war among the city-states of Sumer for two thousand years spurred the development of military technology and technique far beyond that found elsewhere at the time. The first war for which there is any detailed evidence occurred between the states of Lagash and Umma in 2525 B.C. In this war Eannatum of Lagash defeated the king of Umma. The importance of this war to the military historian lies in a commemorative stele that Eannatum erected to celebrate his victory.

It is called the Stele of Vultures for its portrayal of birds of prey and lions tearing at the corpses of the defeated dead as they lay on the desert plain. The stele represents the first important pictorial of war in the Sumerian period. The Stele of Vultures portrays the king of Lagash leading an infantry phalanx of armored, helmeted warriors, armed with spears, trampling their enemies. The king, with a socket axe, rides a chariot drawn by four onagers (wild asses.) In a lower panel, Eannatum holds a sickle-sword. The information and implications of this stele are priceless.

The stele demonstrates that the Sumerian troops fought in phalanx formation, organized six files deep, with an eight-man front, somewhat similar to the formation used in Archaic Greece. Fighting in phalanx requires training and discipline, and the stele thus suggests that the men in this battle were professional soldiers. The typical neolithic army of men brought together to meet a temporary crisis found in Egypt throughout the Old Dynasty period had been clearly superseded in Sumer by the professional standing army. We know from the Tablets of Shuruppak (2600 B.C.) that even at this early date the kings of the city-states provided for the maintenance of 600-700 hundred soldiers on a full-time basis. This provision of military equipment for the soldiers was a royal expense. Gone was the practice of each warrior fashioning his own equipment. The stele provides the first evidence in human history of a standing professional army.

The first historical evidence of soldiers wearing helmets is also provided on the stele. From the bodies of soldiers found in the Death Pits of Ur dating from 2500 B.C., we know that these helmets were made of copper and probably had a leather liner or cap underneath. The appearance of the helmet marks the first defensive response to the killing power of an important offensive weapon, the mace, probably the oldest effective weapon of war. It was an extremely effective weapon against a soldier with no protection for the head. But in Sumer, the presence of a well-crafted helmet indicated a major development in military technology that was so effective that it drove the mace from the battlefield.

The first military application of the wheel is depicted on the stele which shows Eannatum riding in a chariot. Interestingly, the Sumerians also invented the wheeled cart, which became the standard vehicle for logistical transport in the Middle East until the time of Alexander the Great. The Sumerian invention of the chariot ranks among the major military innovations in history. The Sumerian chariot was usually a four-wheeled vehicle (although there are examples of the two-wheeled variety in other records) and required four onagers to pull it.

The Sumerians are also credited with inventing the rein ring for use with the chariot in order to give the driver some control over the onagers . At this early stage of development the chariot probably was not a major offensive weapon because of its size, weight, and instability. In all probability it was not produced in quantity. Later, however, in the hands of the Hyksos, Hittites, Cannanites, Egyptians, and Assyrians, the chariot became the primary striking vehicle of the later Bronze and early Iron Age armies. Chariot drivers, archers, and spearmen became the elite fighting corps of the ancient world. In some countries of the area, the tradition continues to this day. It is not accidental that the Israeli army named its first tank the Merkava . In Hebrew, Merkava means chariot.

The lower palette of the Stele of Vultures shows the king holding a sickle-sword. The sickle-sword became the primary infantry weapon of the Egyptian and Biblical armies at a much later date. When the Bible speaks of peoples being “smoted,” the reference is precisely to the sickle-sword. The fact that the sickle-sword appears on two independent renderings of the same period suggests strongly that the Sumerians invented this important weapon sometime around 2500 B.C.

The stele shows Eannatum’s soldiers wearing what appears to be armored cloaks. Each cloak was secured around the neck and was made either of cloth or, more probably, thin leather. Metal disks with raised centers or spines like the boss on a shield were sown on the cloak. Although somewhat primitive in application, the cloak was the first representation of body armor, and would have afforded relatively good protection against the weapons of the day. Later, of course, the Sumerians introduced the use of overlapping plate body armor.

Other ancient Sumerian archaeological sources portray additional examples of important military innovations. A carved conch plate shows the king of Ur armed with a socket axe. The development of the bronze socket axe remains one of Sumer’s major military innovations, one that conferred a significant military advantage. Ancient axe makers had difficulty in affixing the axeblade to the shaft with sufficient strength so as to allow it to remain attached when striking a heavy blow. The use of the cast bronze socket, which slipped over the head of the shaft and could be secured with rivets, allowed a much stronger attachment of the blade to the shaft. It is likely that the need for a stronger axe arose in response to the development of some type of body armor that made the cutting axe less effective as a killing instrument.

Further, Sumerian axes by 2500 B.C. clearly show a change in design. The most significant change was a narrowing of the blade so as to reduce the impact area and bring the blade to more of a point. The development marks the beginning of the penetrating axe, whose narrow blade and strong socket made it capable of piercing bronze plate armor. The result was the introduction of one of the most devastating weapons of the ancient world, a weapon that remained in use for two thousand years.

The military technology of the ancient world did not, as in modern times, develop independent of need. There were, after all, no research and development establishments to invent new weapons. In the ancient world military technology arose in response to perceived practical needs arising from battlefield experience. And in Sumer, two thousand years of war among the city-states provided the opportunity for constant military innovation. In other countries, such as Egypt, that were sealed off from major enemies by geography and culture, there was little need to change military technologies. The weapons of Egypt, as a result, remained far behind developments in Sumer because they were adequate to the task at hand. There was no need to develop body armor, the helmet, or the penetrating axe when one’s enemies did not possess this technology. But sophisticated weaponry and tactics required some form of larger social organization to give them impetus and direction.

We know very little about the military organization of Sumer in the third millennium. We can judge from the Tablets of Shuruppak (2600 B.C.) that the typical city-state comprised about 1800 square miles, including all its fields and lands. This area could sustain a population of between 30 and 35 thousand people. The tablets record a force of between 600-700 hundred soldiers serving as the king’s bodyguard, the corps of the professional army. But a population of this size could easily support an army of regular and reserve forces numbering between four and five thousand men at full mobilization.

Surely some form of conscription must have existed since theirs was a common tradition of corve’e labor to maintain the dikes and temples. Yet the military confrontations of the time may not have required very large armies. Conscript troops would not usually be capable of the training and discipline required of an infantry phalanx. If they were used, they were likely armed with some other weapons, like the sickle-sword or the bow, whose application could be taught to an average conscript or reservist in a few days.

One fact contributing strongly to the possibility of some sort of military organization was that by 2400 B.C. the Sumerian kings had largely abandoned their religious functions to the priesthoods while increasing their civil functions and control. The kings became the undisputed controllers of civic resources. Moreover, it is simply not reasonable to expect that a people who could organize themselves to tame the Tigris and Euphrates with an elaborate system of dikes, canals, and bridges and who could sustain a sophisticated system of irrigation would, at the same time, have simply left to chance the organization of their military arm, among the most important roles of the king.

The period following Eannatum’s death was characterized by more war, a situation that led to a relatively even development of weapons technology throughout the city-states of Sumer. Two hundred years after Eannatum, King Lugalzagesi of Umma succeeded in establishing his influence over all of Sumer, although there is no evidence that he introduced any significant changes. Twenty-four years later, the empire of Lugalzagesi was destroyed by the forces of a Semitic prince from the northern city of Akkad, Sargon the Great. By force of arms he conquered all the Sumerian states, the entire Tigris-Euphrates basin, and brought into being an empire that stretched from the Taurus Mountains to the Persian Gulf. Sargon united both halves of Mesopotamia for the first time since 4000 B.C.

As with most early Sumerian kings, we know little about Sargon the Great. Cuneiform records indicate that in his 50-year reignhe fought no fewer than 34 wars. One account suggests that his core military force numbered 5,400 men; if that account is accurate, then Sargon’s standing army at full mobilization would have constituted the largest army of the time by far. Even for this time a standing army of this size is not as outrageous as it may seem. Unlike leaders of the previous wars between the rival city-states, Sargon created a national empire and would have required a much larger force than usual to sustain it, as he and his heirs did for 300 years. In this sense, Sargon faced the same problem as Alexander.

Like Alexander, once the city-states were brought to heel, Sargon would have required them to place at his disposal some of their military forces. As we have noted, each of the 14 major city-states could have sustained an army of between four and five thousand men, not counting the small states that would also have been forced to contribute. Yet another source of military manpower would have been available from the conquered non-Sumerian provinces. It was common practice through Greek and Roman times to enlist soldiers of the conquered into the imperial armies of the time. The armies of imperial Egypt, Assyria, Persia, and Rome all had large contingents of former enemies within their ranks.

That Sargon’s army would have been comprised of professionals seems obvious in light of the constant state of war that characterized his reign. Even if they had begun as conscripts, within a short time Sargon’s soldiers would have become battle-hardened veterans. Equipping an army of this size would have necessitated a high degree of military organization to run the weapons and logistics functions, to say nothing of routine administration likely attendant to a people who, by Sargon’s time, had been keeping written records for more than a millennium.

During the Sargonid period, the Summerians/Akkadians contributed yet another major innovation in weaponry, the composite bow. The innovation may have come during the reign of Naram Sin (2254-2218), Sargon’s grandson. Like his grandfather, Naram Sin fought continuous wars of suppression and conquest. His victory over the Lullubi is commemorated in a rock sculpture that shows Naram Sin armed with a composite bow. This rendering marks the first appearance of the composite bow in history and strongly suggests it was of Sumerian/Akkadian origin.

This bow was a major military innovation. While the simple bow could kill at ranges from 50-100 yards, it would not penetrate even simple armor at these ranges. The composite bow, with a pull of 2-3 times that of the simple bow, would easily have penetrated leather armor, and perhaps even the early prototypes of bronze armor that were emerging at this time. Even in the hands of untrained conscript archers, the composite bow could bring the enemy under a hail of arrows from twice the distance as the simple bow. So important was this new weapon that it became a basic implement of war in all armies of the region for the next fifteen hundred years.

The armies of Sumer and Akkad represented the pinnacle of military development in the Bronze Age. No army of the same period could match the Sumerians in military effectiveness and weaponry. The Sumerian civilization produced no fewer than six major new weapons and defensive systems, all of which set the standard for other armies of the Bronze Age and Iron Ages. Few armies in history have been so innovative.

The armies of Egypt, on the other hand, although already a thousand years old by the time of Sargon, were technologically inferior to the Sumerians and would remain so until, in a remarkable example of technological transfer, the Egyptians themselves obtained the weapons of the Sumerians and used them to forge the world’s next great military empire.

Conclusion

The evolution of sophisticated armies and the conduct of war in Sumer and Egypt, while truly a major development in human history, by no means represented the ultimate development of warfare in the ancient world. Much to the contrary. As sophisticated as the armies were in these societies, they represented only the beginning of a period of military development, the Iron Age, that continued for another two thousand years.

In this later period it is fair to say that with only a few exceptions, most notably the classical Greeks, the world witnessed a period of fifteen hundred years in which the conduct of war increased in scope, scale, lethality, and sophistication in an unbroken, upward trend that finally ended with the collapse of the Roman imperium in the 5th century A.D. And when that period finally did come to an end, it took the armies of Europe more than a thousand years to reach the level of sophistication in war that the armies of the Iron Age had so consistently demonstrated for more than a millennium.

During the Iron Age almost every aspect of war was developed to modern scale. Armies increased in size with a corollary increase in their destructive power, which further produced larger and larger battles resulting in higher and higher casualty rates. The integration of military structures with their host societies increased greatly, in some instances (Assyria) producing the ancient equivalent of the modern military state. This permitted armies for the first time to suffer major defeats while the state retained the power to continue military operations for years on end (Second Punic War). The productive power of the state to generate ever larger populations and more sophisticated economies for use in war also increased, culminating in the ability of some states to give birth to an even larger form of sociomilitary organization, the imperium.

At the same time there was a genuine revolution in military technology that increased the range and rates of fire of weapons, providing armies with an ever increasing killing capability. When this ability joined with the ability to logistically support and maneuver larger armies over greater and greater distances, the ability to conduct war increased almost exponentially over the level of the Egyptians and Sumerians fifteen hundred years earlier.

Indeed, it seems likely that the period between the collapse of Sumer and the fall of Rome can legitimately be viewed as the most dynamic period of military development ever witnessed by man until the 20th century. Modern warfare and its corollary, the destruction of whole societies, were already facts of life in the ancient world. Seen in this context, the invention and use of mechanized weapons in the modern era represents more of a variation on a very old theme than a qualitative change in the evolution of warfare.

Sumerian straddle car

The defensive armaments of the soldiers of Sumer and Mari

by

Juan-Luis Montero Fenollós – University of Coruña

[This paper is a study about the protection (helmet, shield and cape) used by soldiers in Sumer and Mari during the third millennium BC].

It is a commonplace to insist on the frequency of wars in the ancient world and in particular in the Syrian-Mesopotamian area. In fact, the history of this region was the result of a long succession of armed conflicts and conquests, of frequent battles between the plains and mountains, and even bitter struggles surrounding the geographical change. Not surprisingly, therefore, political history of the region was organized in the mid-third millennium BC, about the constant rivalry of only a dozen Sumerian cities: Ur, Uruk, Lagash, Umma, and so on. Of these continuing wars, of almost endemic existence, we only know that the rulers were those recorded in certain monuments to perpetuate the memory of their most glorious victories. An excellent example is found in an inscription of Eannatum of Lagash, in which the Sumerian monarch boasts of having conquered the neighbouring cities of Uruk, Ur, Kish, and even that of Mari, in the Middle Euphrates 1. Political fragmentation and intense rivalry developed between small Sumerian city-states was such that they only knew peace as an interruption of war or when one could impose their hegemony 2.

We have little reliable data on which to build to study military activity in Mesopotamia, especially for the most archaic periods in its history. The evidence of the military conflicts of the late fourth millennium BC are very rare in the Sumerian field, however in Uruk a series of seal impressions on clay has been conserved that illustrate, in a very schematic way, prisoners 3 captured and tortured. These images must correspond to local conflicts as military raids to foreign lands will not be rendered until the period of Akkad.

Perhaps it is the system of fortifications built by the Sumerian cities that provide the best evidence of the art of war in the region. A good example is the adobe walls of Uruk, about 10 km in length and defended by more than 900 soldiers 4. Despite the great difficulties to date with accuracy it is a great defensive construction, according to the cuneiform literature, built in the times of Gilgamesh 5. Uruk is an excellent example of the enormous efforts that were made to make the Sumerian city-state built for defense, its explanation must be sought, no doubt, in the frequent conflicts that remained between them for control of irrigation water and arable land.

Equally impressive was the inner wall of Mari, Syria, a construction of 1200m diameter raised in 2900 BC on a large stone base that supported an adobe wall 8m high and 7.50 m wide 6.

These fortifications, besides having an obvious sense to guard the city, were the symbol of their political identity, just as the temple was the expression of their religious identity. The wall represented the capacity and organizational control exercised by the first urban elites. It seems clear that the Mesopotamian rulers celebrated the construction of a new wall, as a sign of urban civilization against the barbarism of the outside world. By contrast, a city beaten in war with the accompaniment of the demolition of its defensive walls such as did Rimush king of Akkad (2278-2270 BC) was a potent sign of its defeat, as made clear  in some of his commemorative inscriptions 7.

In the field of war the Sumerian rulers sought to send us documents which were clearly propagandistic in nature and therefore of little objectivity. What must not be forgotten is that most of the information available is unidirectional, which was generated by one party of the conflict, who is always the winner. The best proof is in the famous Stele of Vultures, an iconographic and epigraphic monument set up by the monarch Eannatum of Lagash (2455-2424 BC) to commemorate his victory on the neighbouring city-state of Umma 8. However, it does seem to show us the documentation that, in general, the war in Mesopotamia, far from being presented as a calamity of which was necessary to preserve the city, but in fact becomes a duty to which monarchs could not escape.

The precise reasons which led to armed clashes we do not have from contemporary accounts. However, economic considerations would no doubt be prevailing in an area such as Mesopotamia, whose political prosperity was closely linked to the development of irrigated agriculture and foreign trade. The crises that Sumerian cities faced, or rather the dominant cause in these, more often than not comprised economic privileges. Consequently, the defence of the interests of the community and its military equipment were issues that could not be left to the whims of chance. In this sense, the appearance of metal in the region plays a key role in introducing something new ie the concern of Syrian-Mesopotamian monarchs to secure control of the supply routes of copper and tin, as the most optimal way to improve technically the weapons in their arsenals, and thus ensure their power. In this context we must place the cities of Mari and Ur, two of the best examples of city-states of the early third millennium, an important place in the control of routes of metal. In this control resided the power, prosperity and prestige of their elite governors 9.

The emergence of metal in the field of war represented a revolution. The first weapons were of stone, as the spherical clubs and arrowheads of flint or obsidian, hardened clay as sling bullets, or even wood. With the use of copper and bronze alloy, the arms not only gained in quality and efficiency through the use of a better suited material, but its design evolved into more complex forms, following the rhythm of military innovation. Surprisingly, the cuneiform sources remain silent about the types of weapons, in which manufacture of metallurgical state must have been very busy, especially during periods of political instability 10. By contrast, the different models found in the metallic arms excavations and various figural representations (if stone reliefs panels scale) provide us with extensive information on the impact they had on the metal weapons in the mid-third millennium BC.

When classifying the individual Sumerian soldier weapons we have to resort to traditional division between offensive and defensive weapons. Within the first, we must distinguish between pod weapons (like daggers), those of shaft (like the spear) and powered (like the points of arrow or sling bullets). The defensive armament in the country of Sumer and the kingdom of Mari consisted of three essential elements, a sustained and active shield and two passive and taken about himself, the helmet and cape. The helmet, shield and coat used by Sumerian armies and Mariotas as a means of protection during the Early Dynastic III period (c. 2550-2400 BC) are the subject of this paper.

For the study of these defensive weapons used by Syrian-Mesopotamian infantry, the modern historian has two types of documentary sources: the archaeological and iconographic. Unfortunately, the epigraphic documentation is silent about it.

The few archaeological remains we know about these weapons are marked by circumstances, all of which are the result of excavations, from the early twentieth century, and therefore, little rigorous methodology. This causes the information provided by these pioneering works to be not as detailed as we would like them to be, both in regard to the object itself and its archaeological context. However, this does not detract in any way form the usefulness of this documentation.

 

The land of Sumer

Tello, the ancient Sumerian city of Girsu, gives us the first known example in Mesopotamia of the use of a military helmet 11. These are fragments of a specimen found by a French team in 1903 on the northern slopes of the Tell of the “Maison des Fruits” (fig. 4:3). The helmet had the following technical and formal features: made of copper or brass, slightly tapered design, covering in full the ears and neck of the individual, and topped by a small projection along a series of small holes along the entire length of the framing edges soldier’s face. The function of these holes should be fixed to the helmet with a textile lining designed for a more comfortable fit with the metal 12. Nothing is said, however, about the size and precise dating of this finding, although it may date without difficulty in the Early Dynastic III.

Also in the land of Sumer, specifically the PG/789 tomb of the famous Royal Cemetery of Ur (Early Dynastic IIIa) there are remains of several metal helmets. In the dromos access to this spectacular tomb, published as the “King’s Grave”, what was unearthed were the skeletons of six Sumerians soldiers wearing helmets and provided with lanzas 13 (Fig. 4:1). The helmets were found broken and crushed on the buried skull, which has made it difficult to reconstruct its exact form (Fig. 4:3). By drawings published by C.L. Woolley we have to distinguish between two types of helmets used by the Ur infantry 14. The first type was more or less semicircular, which had a small projection at the top. It was also equipped with protections for the ears (Fig. 4:2a and b). One of them had a curved silver bar, which could be used as a strap to hold the helmet to the chin (fig. 4:2b). The second model was conical in shape and protected both the neck and ears (Fig. 4:2a).

The helmets found in Ur, in all cases, were copper or bronze and presumably lined on the inside by some kind of padded cloth, of which there are no British archaeologists observed remains. However, a recent study of human skeletons found in the necropolis of Ur has brought new and interesting data 15. By skull radiography of helmet No. 46 in the soldier’s grave PG/789 (Fig. 4:1) what has been revealed is that the edge was perforated with small holes (detail not shown in the drawings listed in Woolley fig.4:2). This type of piercing, the job of which was to establish a protective liner inside the helmet, it can easily be seen in the contemporary copy of Girsu (fig. 4:3). The study also shows this soldier was a teenage male who, despite his youth, had lost some teeth before death, but not from teeth decay. Although this may seem anecdotal, it is interesting to note that for the first time, we have reliable information on the physical features of a Sumerian soldier.

This lot of six metal helmets complete with another copy from the tomb PG/755, belonging to an individual wearing Meskalamdug 16 (Fig. 2: 2). Its dimensions are: 23 cm high by 26 cm wide (from front to back). Unlike earlier, this helmet was ornamental, was made entirely of gold and reproduced in minute detail a luxuriant hair, a ribbon or headband holding a sort of cogotera, as effective means of ensuring better protection for the neck. This is undoubtedly a commemorative helmet used by the Sumerian monarchy 17.

The helmet allowed only the visible face to be seen by the individual who used it, protecting both the occipital and temporal areas of his skull. To allow for hearing, the headdress had a hole at the height of the ears, which were also represented on the helmet. Another highlight, finally, is the presence of small holes along the entire perimeter of the helmet, whose function was to fasten a fabric lining and wool remains found at Adheridos 18.

Another valuable piece of information on helmet use by the military comes from the famous Sumerian Royal Standard of Ur PG/77919 found in the tomb. This monument was made of two panels elaborately inlaid with pearl and lapis lazuli. In one of them, it represents a scene of organized warfare in three horizontal registers. The conquering king, before whom are his enemies naked which is exactly in the middle of the upper register. It is the centerpiece of the composition. After he marches, his army consisting of infantry and war chariots 20, despite being a very schematic representation, and even somewhat naive, offers us valuable details on the defensive armament of the Sumerians. Both the king and his soldiers are protected on the head by a pointed helmet, leaving only the face uncovered. By a narrow ribbon, the helmet is secured on the neck of the user (Fig. 1: 2). They recall, in short, to those found in the tomb PG/789 and found in Girsu. From this representation, it is impossible to know the material these helmets were manufactured from, but it seems logical, as evidenced by archaeology, that it should be metal.

Helmets with identical characteristics are represented in the Stele of Vultures-Girsu Tello, Eannatum erected by king of Lagash (2455-2454 BC), in the great temple of Ningirsu, to immortalize his victory over Umma 21. The stele, which is preserved in fragmentary form, combines a long cuneiform inscription in bas-relief  with iconographic representations of extraordinary artistic quality. In two of the records appears the king, in one case another on foot and chariot, in front of their tropas 22 (Fig. 1:1). The upper register contains a scene in which appears the infantry of the City of Lagash forming the famous Sumerian phalanx. The training, which appears to be led by King Eannatum, includes several soldiers protected by shields and spear in hand, walking idly on the defeated enemy. In the next record, there is another representation of the king leading an army made up of soldiers carrying spears, axes and helmets on their heads. In both cases, soldiers wear a helmet similar to the example of copper found in the excavations of Tello. For its part, the helmet exhibited by King Eannatum is similar to the gold standard from the Meskalamdug tomb of Ur.

Next to the helmet, the shield is another basic defensive weapon in the armory of the Sumerian soldier. However, the perishable nature of the material they were made from (wood and leather, no doubt) explains that no remains have reached us. Only the royal tomb of Ur PG/789 has provided some remains, attributable to a shield. Between two groups of spears, and surrounded by several skeletons of soldiers, appeared an object of copper, which originally had been attached to a surface Madera 23. The object, or what remains of it, consists of a copper strip (43 cm long) and decorated with a rosette on each side, two lions that walk on the prostrate figure of a man naked (Fig. 2: 1). Due to its characteristics and its location inside the tomb, this piece could be one of those typical metal reinforcement Sumerian shield, as we reported some época 24 illustrations.

The best known representation of the type of shield used by the Sumerian army comes from the aforementioned Stele of the Vultures (Fig. 1: 1). In the upper register of this monument appears cohort of soldiers advancing under the protection of four large shields covering the body of soldier from neck to ankles. These are rectangular and have their surface, which was made of wood and/or leather, reinforced with a series of metal studs. Behind each of these shields, are the hands of six soldiers holding as many spear 25.

There is another means of protection used by Sumerian infantry we find represented in the central register of the war scene of the royal standard of Ur (Fig. 1: 2). The soldiers, who appear equipped with spear and helmet, wear a long coat closed to the chest. This is probably heavy layers of leather, covering the Sumerian soldier’s body to knee length, this clothing was also enhanced with detail that is clearly shown as circular pieces, no doubt metal 26 studs. In the Stele of the Vultures, however, some are foot soldiers, covering his chest, two bands of (leather?) protection triangularly arranged between the shoulders and the waist (Fig. 1: 3) 27.

The kingdom of Mari

In the ancient city of Mari, the capital of the most important kingdom in the Middle Euphrates, we have not found to date archaeological remains of defensive weapons for the third millennium BC. By contrast, the excavation works have recovered an interesting iconographic documentation about it. These are small figures in mother of pearl, belonging to the panels inlay, and an engraved stone plate. All these findings come from different contexts the city of Mari II (2550-2400 BC).

One of the most interesting objects in the room comes from XLVI of “Sacred Precinct” and is a small piece of white stone decorated incise 28. It shows a scene of war with three characters: a soldier equipped with a large shield and a spear, another soldier behind him with a composite bow and, finally, an enemy represented completely naked, as is standard art of time (Fig. 3:1). The large shield is just a screen equipped with a handle and made from bundles of reeds, which fully protects the soldier from head to toe. According to Yadin this seems to be a type of shield used by Mesopotamian armies in the art of siege. This hypothesis is based on the enormous similarity between the copy of Mari and shields used by Assyrian soldiers in the siege of cities, as seen in several reliefs of the first millennium BC 29 In fact, Dur-Sharrukin found a relief with a representation similar to that of Mari, in a scene referring to the siege of a fortified city 30.

Besides the shield, the Mariate soldier uses other elements to protect the body. It is a kind of rectangular shape layer, resting on one shoulder, covering both chest and back. In Mari were found several figurines carved from mother of pearl in which individuals represented make use of such a protective layer, which was narrow (not greater than 30 cm wide) and long (about 2 meters in length), so it came to rodilla 31 (fig. 3:1, 2 and 4). Although we cannot categorically be completely secure due to lack of data, it is logical think it was a thick leather protection reinforced with a series of small pieces of circular metal. In fact, this type of reinforcement is very similar to what we observed in the shields (Stele of Vultures) and Sumerian army layers (Standard of Ur). This layer was used exclusively by infantry (archers and spearmen) in Mariote army, as their use has not been witnessed in any other city in the Syrian-Mesopotamian area. Its function was to cover the vital organs when throwing weapons on the battlefield, that is, before a precedent of the use of metal armor and chainmail.

The third element of personal protection used by foot soldiers of Mari was the helmet. The most common model is one that has a slightly conical shape, covering the ears and part of neck, leaving the soldier’s face visible. Some of them were provided with a tape to hold them to cuello 32 (Fig. 3: 1, 2 and 4). The material with which these helmets were manufactured is unknown, since no copy has been found in the archaeological excavations of Mari 33. This suggests that they must be manufactured most likely with a perishable product such as leather, but also could be metal as in Sumer.

From the temple of Ishtar at Mari comes a warrior carved in a shell plate, which according to Parrot must have belonged to the decoration of the hilt of a dagger or puñal 34 (Fig. 3:3). The warrior in question bears on his right hand a typical tube enmangue ax 35 and has left us with an enigmatic object with a curved profile, surely a curved sword blade. Today we know that this is a weapon with a strong symbolism 36, as evidenced by their frequent appearance in the hands of kings and gods in various reliefs and seals. A good example is the representation of the king Eannatum in the Wake of the Buitres 37. Likewise, in the royal tombs of Byblos and Tello have been found several examples of this type of sword clearly associated with royalty and a symbol of the divine origin of his authority 38.

The range of this individual Mari, called the “à l’Herminette Guerrier” by Parrot, are full with a helmet, something more complex than the model used by Mariote infantry. Again, the best parallel is found in the Stele of the Vultures, the helmet worn on the head of Eannatum of Lagash and gold in the hull of Meskalamdug Ur, in both cases, as in Mari are provided with a cogotera as a means to protect the neck. All this data point to an obvious conclusion: we have the representation of a member of the ruling elite of the II city of Mari (c.2550-2400 BC), in all probability the king.

Conclusions

After the previously mentioned, it is evident that both Sumer and Mari personal protection used by the army on foot made a significant improvement. This change is a response to two revolutionary innovations that transform the art of war in Mesopotamia in the mid-third millennium B.C. The first is related to the introduction in the region of metal, in general, and of the bronze alloy, in particular. The widespread use of metallurgical technology radically changed military tactics of the time, since the new raw material will be found in a main armament that develops. In fact, the repertoire of weapons made of metal is multiplied with the emergence of diverse, sophisticated and effective swords, daggers, axes, spears, javelins, arrows, etc.

In this process of improvement of weapons, the appearance of bronze will play a important role. The first reliable archaeological evidence on the use of copper-tin alloy in Mesopotamia belong to the early third millennium BCE epigraphic documentation supports AC 39 also archaeological data as an ancient text of Ur, dating from the Early Dynastic I, is observed with the first distinction between copper (urudu) and bronze (zabar) 40. However, the real distribution of Mesopotamian bronze in the country will not occur until the Early Dynastic III period in which the brassware findings are more general. Among these objects there is the presence of a high percentage of weapons.

The use of tin in the metal workshops allowed the physical qualities of copper to transform, giving it greater strength and toughness. Therefore, the use of bronze weapons, and also in tools, was very useful, since it represented a significant technological improvement compared to unalloyed copper. The generalization of the new alloy had an impact on the art of war, and it actively contributed to workshops dedicated to the manufacture of weapons. From the mid-third millennium BC, Sumerian panoply of the soldier is enhanced by the emergence of new and effective designs 41.

The use of tin, too,  has a remarkable economic change. This precious and scarce metal, which was lacking in Mesopotamia, required the monarchies of the region a huge commercial and diplomatic effort to gain access to the new raw material with which to improve and maintain their arsenals 42.

The introduction of bronze in the manufacture of weapons will be accompanied by another novelty in the field of arms. This is the appearance of the composite bow whose first use is traditionally attributed to Mesopotamian armies, and incorrectly, the Empire of Akkad 43.

From the information available, it appears that the composite bow was part of the (Sumerian?) Syrian army. However, we must be very cautious about the absence in the archaeological record of such weapons. In fact, in 1971, André Parrot published a representation, attributed to the Early Dynastic III, which shed new light on the use of the composite bow in Mari 44.

The invention of the composite bow will revolutionize military tactics and the means to protect against this weapon, which was used mainly in the art of siege. This arrows arc was very effective in conveying the huge energy stored in the time to stretch the rope. Contemporary experiments, made from replicas of Egyptian composite bows have revealed that the speed achieved by arrows was about 50 m per second 45. The pervasiveness of arrows shot from such bows was huge.

The archer used to carry more than one type of arrow in his quiver: first, a bronze arrows weight with which to pierce shields and other body armor at close range and on the other hand, lighter arrows with which to harass the enemy at long distance 46. We must not forget also the psychological effect that was had on the soldiers as the rain of arrows were poisoned. It is estimated that an archer could shoot about ten arrows a minute 47.

Another element to be incorporated into the field at archery when fired was using flaming arrows. In the aforementioned plate Mari (Fig. 3: 1) shows an archer ready to launch a shaft provided with a series of small strokes that appear to be a schematic representation of fire. It is estimated that the height of 30 m and 40 m distance reached by the composite bow shot was enough to penetrate into the houses of a besieged city. A bow with greater power would extinguish the flames 48.

The response to the emergence in the mid-third millennium BC of the composite bow and weapons of Bronze was the proliferation of new systems of personal and collective protection with which to counteract the effectiveness of these weapons. Many cities were provided with a double room walled with which to deal with the archers. This is the case of the city of Mari, which had two lines of wall. The first line was formed, at the time of establishment of the city c.2900 BC, of a rubble-mound breakwater, with a small wall that protected it from floods of the Euphrates. It was a real wall. By contrast, cities Mari II and III transformed the outer breakwater defensive 49 into an impressive wall. Between the two lines of defense was a distance of 350 m, sufficient to negate the effectiveness of the arrows. We see here in all probability the solution of the Mariotas provided by the leaders to address the threat posed by the use of the composite bow in war. However, the city of Mari will be destroyed twice: once for the king Naram-Sin of Akkad (c.2238 BC) and another Hammurabi of Babylon (c.1760 BC).

To counter new weapons, the Syrian-Mesopotamian army, whose backbone was the infantry, will be provided with better and stronger means of protection. The soldier had available, as we have seen previously, three basic types of defensive weapons: the helmet, shield and coat.

The helmet worn by Sumerian soldier was metal, as evidenced by the findings of Tello and Ur. These should be of bronze, since this alloy is much more resistant to the impacts of copper or leather. From the known documentation we can distinguish two types – one in a somewhat more pointed and one rounded and pointed at the top. Both were employed by the Sumerian army.

In Mari have not been found to date, the remains of any helmet. However, thanks to the known old iconography commonly used by the Mariotas was the model with a or pointed slightly conical design that covered the ears and neck of the user. In most cases, a metal or leather strap attachment to the neck secured the helmet on the soldier. However, the use of the rounded type is not attested among Mariotas soldiers.

By contrast, in the Syrian interior, in the city-state of Ebla we do have evidence of the use of the two helmet models documented in Sumer. Among the figures carved in marble, belonging to a large panel which decorated a room in the famous royal palace (c.2400 BC), soldiers are provided with both types of helmets 50. Additionally, this same panel wall, made to celebrate a great Eblaite military victory, there is another soldier with spear in hand and covered by a defensive layer, reinforced with circular studs. It Is a protective layer pattern very similar to those shown in the Royal Standard of Ur.

This similarity observed between the Syrian and Sumerian defensive weapons is surprising since the helmet was usually one of the emblems that best defined the geographical-cultural origin of Near Eastern armies. This practice is especially visible during the first millennium BC: Assyrians, Babylonians, neo-Hittite, Aramaic, etc.. used very different helmets as a sign of identity 51. We have further evidence of the strong influence, the result of active cultural contact exerted on Mesopotamian Semitic Ebla and Mari during the Early Dynastic III.

As shown in the performing arts studied, the metal helmet was used exclusively by infantry. There was, however, another type of helmet much more elaborate than the two, which was the most prominent feature of being equipped with a means to ensure the protection of the neck. This model was used only by the elites of both Sumer and Mari. We are, without doubt, to stop a helmet, a symbol or emblem displayed by the monarchy in parades and celebrations. The best example of this we have it in the Stele of the Vultures, Eannatum the king of Lagash leading a copy of this kind on his head, and the gold helmet Meskalamdug of Ur.

The other common element of protection is represented by the shield. Our knowledge is limited to the iconographic material available by the fact that they were made of wood, cane leather and has not allowed their preservation to this day. Exceptionally, we have come across some metal parts, which we could identify with the studs that reinforced shields.

The limited information allows only a brief comparison between Mari and Sumer. In both there are representations of large shields, which were used as a system of collective protection and not individually. Copies at Tello show that only the head and feet are exposed on soldiers, while Mari guarded with integrity who used it.

The last item for the protection of Syrian-Mesopotamian soldiers that we are aware of was as seen in panels inlaid studied, one layer, probably leather metal studs. In this case there does exist a significant difference between the Mariota and Sumerian armies. In Mari, we see that the foot soldier using a protective layer of rectangular shape, narrow and elongated so that, resting on one shoulder, came to the knee. This should be a part relatively light and easy to handle in the field of battle. On the contrary, we find at Ur a classic long coat, heavy-looking, covering both shoulders and closed to the chest. Also, the Sumerian soldier could use, as the Stele of the Vultures, another defensive garment: two bands, possibly leather, covering his v-shaped chest.

All these elements of personal protection are born as a reaction to the appearance in the army in the mid-third millennium BC of soldiers armed with bows and arrows made of bronze, as well as other missiles of high penetration capability. These defense systems continue the process of development up to the complex metal flake reinforcement. This body armor, known as sari (y) am, does not appear in the cuneiform texts by century AC52 XV, a period in which the armor becomes a regular part of military equipment 53. Is the answer to another military innovation: the generalization of two-wheeled light chariot drawn by horses 54. This new means of transport will enable highly mobile efficient firing archers.

Figure 1: 1.-Stele of Vultures, Tello (Parrot, 1961), 2. – Detail Royal Standard of Ur (Woolley,

1934), 3. – Detail of the Stele of the Vultures (Parrot, 1961).

Figure 2: 1. – Possible metallic element of a shield, Ur (Woolley, 1934), 2. – Helmet Meskalamdug,

Ur (Woolley, 1934), 3. – Skull and helmet PG/789 soldier’s tomb, Ur (Woolley, 1934).

Figure 3: 1-4. – Stone plate and inlaid mother-of Mari (Parrot, 1956 and Yadin, 1971).

Figure 4: 1. – Detail PG/789 tomb, Ur (Woolley, 1934), 2. – Metal helmets PG/789 tomb,

Ur (Woolley, 1934); metal helmet Tello (Parrot, 1948).

Notes

1. E. Sollberger and J. R. Kupper, Inscriptions et akkadiennes sumeriennes royales, Paris 1971, p. 58 / IRSA.

2. This is the case, to cite one of the best known examples of Lugalzagesi king of Uruk (2340-2316 BC), so shows one of cuneiform inscriptions (cf. E. Sollberger and Kupper Jr., IRSA, p. 94).

3. M.A. Brandes, Siegelabrollungen archaischen aus den in Uruk-Warka Bauschichten, Wiesbaden 1979, fig.1-13, P. Collins, The Uruk Phenomenon, Oxford 2000, p. 97.

4. J.L. Huot et al., Naissance des cités, Paris 1990, p. 61.

5. Epic of Gilgamesh, I, 9.

6. J.C. Margueron, “Mari: derniers Développements des recherches sur le tell conduites Hariri” in P. Matthiae et al. (Eds.): Ist International Congress on the Archaeology of Ancient Near East, Rome 2000, p.916 / ICAANE.

7. E. Sollberger and J.R. Kupper, IRSA, p.102.

8. J.S. Cooper, Reconstructing History from Ancient Inscriptions. The Lagash-Umma Border Conflict. Malibu 1983.

9. J.L. Montero, “Mari, center international du commerce des Métaux” Eridu Monografies 1 (2001) 125-133.

10. This is not the case file paleobabilónico Mari Palace, which contains a valuable documentation cuneiform on the guidelines issued by different kings of the city to the urgent bronze weapons 10000 and 1000 arrows, spears and shields, bows, axes, etc.. (Cf. J.M. Durand, Documents du palais épistolaires Mari. Take II Paris 1998, p. 394-397 / DEPM).

11. A. Parrot, Tello. Vingt Campagnes of fouilles (1877-1933), Paris 1948, p. 106.

12. G. Cros, Nouvelles fouilles Tello, Paris 1910, p.44.

13. C.L. Woolley, Ur Excavations II. The Royal Cemetery. Text and Plates, London 1934, p.63 / EU.

14. C.L. Woolley, EU pl.218.

15. T. Molleson and D. Hodgson, “The Human Remains from Woolley’s Excavations at Ur” Iraq 65 (2003) 107 and fig. 13.

16. C.L. Woolley, EU p.156.

17. The identity of the individual buried in the tomb PG/755 is still an open question. Among the furnishings appeared a glass of gold inscribed with the name of Meskalamdug and other Ninbanda the name of the queen (cf. CL Woolley, EU p.158). In another cuneiform inscription recorded in an account of lapis lazuli found in Mari reappears name Meskalamdug as king of Kish and Mesannepada brother. The latter was the first king of the First Dynasty of Ur, according to the List Sumerian king (cf. J. Boese, “Schatz von und der Mesannepada Mari” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 68 (1978) 6-33).

18. C.L. Woolley, EU p.552.

19. C.L. Woolley, EU p.266.

20. It is generally agreed that the Standard of Ur is a military victory and that the set of the two panels like a narration of the different steps leading to victory and the subsequent conclusion (cf. A. Parrot, Sumer, Madrid 1961 p.146-150). However, J.C. Margueron (cf. “L’Etendard d’Ur: recit historique ou magique?”, In H. Gasche and B. Hrouda (eds.): Collectanea Orientalia. Histoire, Arts de l’espace et industrie de la terre, Neuchâtel-Paris, p.169) considers Inappropriate see this monument commemorating a historical accurate. In his opinion, this is the eternal restatement of the theme of conquering king of all Mesopotamian ruler liked to surround himself.

21. E. Sollberger and J.R. Kupper, IRSA, p. 47.

22. A. Parrot, Sumer, p.135.

23. C.L. Woolley, EU p. 69.

24. However, there is no unanimity on the issue, as other researchers consider most appropriate interpretation as part of the front of a tank (cf. DP Hansen, “Art of the Tombs of Ur A Brief Interpretation”, in RL Zettler and L. Horne (eds.): Tresaures from the Royal Tombs of Ur, Philadelphia, p.67).

25. A. Parrot, Sumer, p.135.

26. Y. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands I, New York 1963, p.49 / AWBL.

27. A. Parrot, Sumer, p.134.

28. A. Parrot, “I fouilles of Mari. Dix-neuvième campagne (printemps 1971) ” Syria XLVIII (1971) 269 / Syria.

29. Y. Yadin, “The Earliest Representation of a Siege Scene from Bow Scythian and to Mari” Israel Exploration Journal, 22 (1978) 92-93 / IEJ.

30. Y. Yadin, IEJ, fig.5.

31. A. Parrot, Mission archéologique of Mari. Take I. Le temple d’Ishtar, Pp.138-139 1956 Paris / MAM; A. Parrot, Syria, 269; R. Dolce, Dynastic dell’epoca intarsi mesopotamici Gli, Rome 1978, tav.XXXIII: M.452 and 351 / GIMEP; N. Stillman and N. Tallis, Armies of the Ancient Near East, 1984, p.124 / NEAA.

32. A. Parrot, MAM, fig. 79; R. Dolce, GIMEP, tav.XXXIII: M.454, A. Parrot, Syria, p.269.

33. Among more than a thousand graves published to date in the city of Mari (fifty of them dating from the Early Dynastic), there have been no soldier’s helmet (cf. M. Jean-Marie, Tombes et necropoles of Mari, Beyruth 1999).

34. A. Parrot, MAM, fig.77 and p.136. However, according J.C. Margueron must have belonged to a composition (cf. L’Art de l’Antiquité. L’Egypte et le Proche-Orient, Paris 1997, p.195).

35. Copies of these axes are common along the Euphrates Basin in the mid-third millennium BC (Cf. J.L. Montero, “Imports and local production in the metallurgical industry of the Upper Syrian Euphrates during the Bronze Age” in From East to West. Tribute to Dr. Emilio Olávarri, Salamanca 1999, pp.276-277).

36. A copy of such swords found in the nearby city of Terqa, although in this case it is a copy of most recent dating, h.1600 B.C. (Cf. D. Bonatz et al., Rivers and Steppes. Cultural Heritage and Environment of the Syrian Jezireh, Damascus 1998, p.99).

37. G. Philip, Metal Weapons of the Early and Middle Bronze Ages in Syria-Palestine, Oxford 1989, pp.142-143.

38. R. Maxwell-Hyslop, “Daggers and Swords in Western Asia”, Iraq 8 (1946) 42-43 and pl.IV.

39. J.L. Montero, Metallurgy in the Ancient Near East (third and second millennia BC) Sabadell 1998, p.126 / MPOA.

40. B. Burrows, Text archaic. Ur Excavations: Texts, II, London, 1935, 11: n.373.

41. The findings of weapons of copper / bronze Shuruppak Sumerian cities as Kish, Ur and Girsu prove it (cf.

1. Heinrich, Fara, Berlin 1931, Tafel 39-40; E. Mackay, A Sumerian Palace and the “A” Cemetery at Kish, Mesopotamia, II,

Chicago 1929, pl.LXII; C.L. Woolley, EU pl.223-224 and 227-228, and H. of Genouillac, Fouilles of Telloh, I, Paris 1934, p.89).

42. On the origin of tin used in Syria and Mesopotamia vine. J.L. Montero, MPOA, pp.36-42 and 52-54.

43. Is this the case, to cite some examples: J. Harmand, Ancient warfare. From Sumer to Rome Madrid 1976, pp.133-134 and R. Chapman, “Weapons and Warfare” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, vol.5, New York 1997, p.336. In fact, the composite bow has been identified in cylinder-seal of the late fourth millennium BC in South Iraq (see PRS Moorey, “The Emergence of the Light, Horse-drawn Chariot in the Near-East c.2000-1500 BC” World Archaeology 18 (1986) 209).

44. A. Parrot, Syria, 269.

45. R. Miller et al. “Experimental Approaches to Ancient Near Eastern Archery” World Archaeology 18 (1986) 179 / WA.

46. In a text of the Amorites of Mari time talking about making bronze arrowheads of different weights: 40 g, 24 g, 16 g and 8 g (cf. J.M. Durand DEPM, p.395).

47. R. Miller et al., WA, p.188.

48. R. Miller et al., WA, p.191.

49. J.C. Margueron, ICAANE, fig.2. J.C. Margueron, I mésopotamiens, Paris 2003, fig. 227 and 228.

50. Syrie. Mémoire et civilization, Paris 1993, p.120 and M. Fortin, Syrie, earthquakes of civilizations, Québec 1999, p.103.

51. N. Stillman and N. Tallis, NEAA, pp.152-175.

52. A Concise Dictionary of Akkadian, p.318, s.v. sari (y) am.

53. Bronze scales belonging to shells have been found in Ugarit (cf. JP Vita, The army of Ugarit, Madrid 1995, p.78).

54. N. Stillman and N. Tallis, NEAA, pp.139-141

Sumerian Hundred Years War – Umma vs Lagash

Umma vs Lagash

A foundation cone of Enmetena gives a summary to the long-lasting border dispute between Umma and Lagash. They fought for possession of the fertile fields of the Guedena. The conflict lasted on and off for many generations starting around the time of 2500 BC through to the rise of Lugalzagesi in 2340 BC. For those interested in reading the composition in its original form (the italicised text below), without the annotations, see Enmetena Cone.

Mesalim, king of Kish.

Enlil, king of all the lands, father of all the gods,
by his righteous command, for Ningirsu and Shara,
demarcated the (border) ground.
Mesalim, king of Kish, by the command of Ishtaran,
laid the measuring line upon it, and on that place he erected a stele.

Here mythology and history become intertwined. Enlil was the chief Sumerian god; Shara and Ningirsu were the patron gods of Umma and Lagash respectively. The story is cast in religious overtones to suggest the demarcation of the Guedena (‘edge of the steppe-lands’) was sanctioned by the gods and the borders were therefore inviolate. This was Lagash’s point of view; Umma obviously held a different opinion.

The war between Umma and Lagash had been going on for quite some time before Mesalim was called upon to settle the dispute. As the king of Kish, Mesalim held suzerainty over the region and his word carried considerable weight and authority. Mesalim apportioned the land between the two cities. A stele was erected at the border to announce his decision. Then a trench was dug with an earthen levee on either side to separate the two territories. Nonetheless, Mesalim’s arbitration did little to resolve the problem. Apparently his decision greatly favored Lagash (the larger and more powerful of the two cities) much to Umma’s lingering resentment. The wars would continue unabated for more than a century.

Ush, ensi of Umma.

Ush, ruler of Umma, something greatly beyond words he did.
That stele he tore out, and into the plain of Lagash he entered.
Ningirsu, the hero of Enlil,
by his (Enlil’s) just command, with Umma battle he did.
By the command of Enlil, he cast (his) big battle-net upon it,
and its many tumuli he laid upon the ground in the plain.

Ush was the first known ruler of Umma to violate the terms of the treaty. He marched across the border and destroyed Mesalim’s stele. This would happen many times during the course of the war. Ush obviously predates Ur-Nanshe, Enmetena’s great-grandfather and the founder of the Lagash I dynasty. An inscription relates that Ur-Nanshe battled with Umma (and its allied city of Ur) at some point during his reign, but the inscription is broken off before the name of the ruler of Umma is revealed. However, it’s unlikely to be Ush. Evidence for this is found in the above section. Notice how the victory is credited to Ningirsu, the god of war, not to a specific ruler of Lagash – war in the Dynastic period of Sumerian history was often waged on ‘behalf’ of the city’s deity. If Ur-Nanshe had been the victor in the battle, then Enmetena surely would have mentioned it. The victory was probably won by Lugal-sha-engur, Ur-Nanshe’s predecessor. Lugal-sha-engur was contemporary with Mesalim, who presented him with a ceremonial macehead for the temple of Ningirsu in Lagash. In any case, Enmetena wasn’t interested in glorifying any dynasty but his own.

The many tumuli “laid upon the ground” were mass graves for the war dead, piled high to emphasize the scope of the king’s victory. Sometimes the tumuli were stacked so high that men had to climb ladders to dump baskets of dirt on top of the bodies.

Eannatum, ruler of Lagash.

Eannatum, ruler of Lagash, uncle of Enmetena, ruler of Lagash,
with Enakale, the ruler of Umma, demarcated the (border) ground,
and its levee from the Princely Canal to the Gu’edena he extended.
Of Ningirsu’s field 215 nindan he left under the control of Umma
and made it into a field with no owner.
On that levee steles he inscribed, and the stele of Mesalim he restored.
Into the plain of Umma he did not pass.
On the boundary mound of Ningirsu (named) Namnunda-kigara,
a dais of Enlil, a dais of Ninhursag, a dais of Ningirsu,
and a dais of Utu he constructed.

It seems as if Eannatum is concluding a treaty after the victory that’s described in the previous section, but this is not the case. That victory was credited to the gods, but Enmetena would have mentioned the fact if the victory had been won by Eannatum, who was his uncle. This section refers to Eannatum’s later victory over Umma, the one that’s depicted on the Vulture Stele (see Vulture Stele Translation).

Actually, at least one other war had been fought with Umma prior to this one. Akurgal, son of Ur-Nanshe and the father of Eannatum, had lost some of the Guedena in an earlier war with Umma. The fact that Akurgal had a very short reign suggests he was killed in the war, though this has not been proven. Even if true, Enmetena wouldn’t include the story here; neither is the story told on the Vulture Stele. Royal monuments never mention defeat. This was one of only two times in the history of the wars that Umma was victorious over Lagash. The other time was about 50 years later, during the reign of Enannatum II, who was the son of Enmetena and the last king of Ur-Nanshe’s dynasty.

Enakale, ruler of Umma. 

Enakale was the new ruler of Umma with whom Eannatum demarcated the new borders. Presumably the previous ruler had been killed in the war with Eannatum. A damaged portion of the Vulture Stele suggests Eannatum sponsored a rebellion against the Ummaite king that occurred simultaneously with his attack on the city, “They shall raise a hand against him, and in the heart of Umma they shall kill him. Usurdu, by name [. . .]” Usurdu was the name of Eannatum’s agent inside the city. This could have been Eannatum’s revenge for the death of his father.

Eannatum built large daises on his side of the border to show that the treaty had the blessing of the gods and to demonstrate his permanent ownership of the land. He set up new steles and restored the stele of Mesalim, which would later be destroyed (again) in yet another war with Umma. Eannatum declared that part of the Guedena would be “a field with no owner”, a kind of No Man’s Land.

He made Enakale swear “By the life of Enlil, king of heaven and earth, the fields of Ningirsu I shall exploit as an interest-bearing loan”, meaning that Umma could farm the fields for the payment of rent (a share of the crops). Eannatum probably thought he was being quite generous, considering the fact that Umma had lost the war, and that Enakale was lucky to have what he could get. Enakale, on the other hand, would certainly find it galling to pay rent for land that he considered to be rightfully his own. Eannatum himself would have shrugged off the matter, “The ruler of Umma, when has he ever been appeased?”

Of the barley of Nanshe and the barley of Ningirsu,
one grain-heap measure (5184 hl.)
the Man of Umma consumed as an interest-bearing loan.
The share of the yield was imposed,
and 144,000 large grain-heap measures it had become.

The narrative has moved forward to the prelude of another war. Eannatum and Enakale have both died. The “Man of Umma” is now Ur-luma, the son of Enakale. He owes a payment for the grain that his city has consumed, grain that was grown in the “fields with no owner” that were actually controlled by Lagash. Interest for the “loan” has accrued, payable as a “share of the yield”. The amount of interest due is difficult to understand because of the different units of measure named in the translation, but it is obviously quite high. The stage was set; the war was about to continue for another generation.

 

Ur-luma, ruler of Umma.

Because he was unable to repay that barley,
Ur-luma, ruler of Umma,
the levee of the boundary territory of Ningirsu
and the levee of the boundary territory of Nanshe
he removed with water.
To its steles he set fire, and he tore them out.
The daises of the gods, which on the Namnunda-kigara (mound)
had been constructed, he demolished.
He hired foreign countries,
and over the levee of the boundary territory of Ningirsu he crossed.

This is actually Ur-luma’s second attack on the border; the previous attack is mentioned in the section below. He destroyed the daises of the gods which Eannatum had built to show Lagash’s ownership of the land. The border steles were once again destroyed, this time with fire. The steles were made of stone, so it’s difficult to imagine how they were burned, but this is how it probably happened: Wood was stacked around the steles then set ablaze. If the fire was hot enough, the limestone steles would burst into flame. Alternatively, fire was used to heat the steles until they were very hot, then suddenly doused with cold water to shatter them. The steles were also uprooted, just for good measure. Then the earthen levees of the boundary trench were washed away with water, effectively erasing the border. This also made it easier for Ur-luma’s army to pass over them. The army now included foreigners that Ur-luma had hired as mercenaries.

Enannatum, ruler of Lagash.

Enannatum, ruler of Lagash,
in the Ugiga field, the field of Ningirsu, had (previously) fought with him,
but Enmetena, the beloved son of Enannatum, defeated him.
Ur-luma fled into the middle of Umma and was killed.
His donkeys, sixty teams,
on the bank of the Lummagirnunta (canal) were left behind,
and their personnel’s bones were all left out on the plain.
Their tumuli in five places he heaped up.

A fanciful depiction of Eannatum in his war cart – note the way the artist has misunderstood Sumerian art depiction with the front of the battle cart on the side – it does convey however the impression of the king attacking with his soldiers quite well.

While Eannatum was still alive, Ur-luma did not dare attack him; Eannatum was too powerful and too great a warrior. Upon the death of Eannatum the kingship passed to his brother Enannatum, the father of Enmetena. At the time, Enannatum had his hands full trying to quell the rebellions in various parts of Eannatum’s crumbling empire. This is when Ur-luma decided to attack.

The first battle occurred in the Ugiga fields. An Enannatum tablet tells us that Ur-luma “by the Hill of the Black Dog brought up his vanguard” (what a perfect place to have a battle, “by the Hill of the Black Dog”). Ur-luma was defeated and fled the battle with Enannatum close upon his heels.The tablet then relates how Enannatum “did smite” Ur-luma all the way up to the levee of the border territory of Ningirsu. Then Ur-luma came to the Lumma-girnunta canal, which blocked his retreat. Ur-luma plunged into the canal in his haste to get away. Enannatum “in the … of the Lumma-girnunta canal went after him, and his outer garment he put all over(?) him.” This suggests Eannatum had actually grabbed Ur-luma’s cloak before Ur-luma was able to free himself and escape. However, the story may be apocryphal. By this time Enannatum was at least 50 years old, quite elderly by the standards of the ancient world, so he may have been too old to participate in the battle except as a general. Perhaps the details of the story narrate the actions of one of his lieutenants. In any case, it shows just how close Ur-luma had come to being captured.

Enannatum died soon afterward. Because of the shortness of his reign (about 7 years) it’s been speculated that Enannatum was killed in the battle just described. This, however, seems unlikely because he is known to be alive at the very end of the battle. Of course he could have been killed in the final skirmish to capture Ur-luma, but it’s far more likely that he later died of natural causes because of his age. The kingship of Lagash now passed to his son Enmetena.

The above section also describes the second battle, with the same disastrous results for Ur-luma. Once again he had to beat a hasty retreat, this time with Enmetena in hot pursuit. Once again he was blocked by the same Lumma-girnunta canal. Once again he managed to get away. He abandoned 60 teams of chariot donkeys (with four per team, that’s 240 donkeys, a large number by Sumerian standards), plus their personnel, plus other soldiers left behind to cover his retreat; not to mention the soldiers unlucky enough to be stranded on the wrong side of the canal when Enmetena’s army fell upon them. Some historians state that the donkeys were slaughtered, but it wasn’t the donkeys that were slaughtered, it was the soldiers. The chariot donkeys were very expensive and highly prized. They would later be used to pull the chariots of Enmetena’s victorious army. As for the enemy soldiers, their bodies were heaped into five tumuli and left out on the plain, their bones bleaching in the sun.

“Ur-luma fled into the middle of Umma and was killed.” Notice how Enmetena doesn’t claim that he killed Ur-luma. If he had killed Ur-luma, he surely would have bragged about it. Instead Ur-luma had already escaped and was in the middle of Umma when he was killed, or “assassinated” to be more precise. Like Darius in his infamous flight from Alexander the Great 2,000 years later, he was probably murdered by someone in his own entourage. Not only had he lost two battles, but he had disgraced himself by running away like a coward. He therefore no longer had the respect of his soldiers or his subjects. Ur-luma thus met the same fate as many other failed kings in the ancient world. He should have done himself a favor by allowing himself to be killed in battle.

Enmetena, ruler of Lagash.

At that time, Il {as in “ill”}, who was the temple administrator of Zabalam,
from Girsu to Umma in retreat(?) he marched.
Il the rulership of Umma seized.

Lagash harbour

This is further proof that Ur-luma was murdered by his own men. It is said that Il “seized” the kingship of Umma, as if were a coup d’état. This is how Enmetena saw the matter, but it is not entirely correct. Ur-luma was succeeded by E’andamu’a, his brother. E’andamu’a died after a brief reign and was succeeded by his son Il, who was Ur-luma’s nephew. It is possible that Ur-luma was assassinated by his own brother; such a thing happened more than once in the ancient world, but a more likely explanation is that he was murdered by someone else and his brother succeeded him because Ur-luma had no sons to inherit his crown. In any case, as will soon become apparent, Il had his own plans about the next war with Lagash.

The levee of the boundary territory of Ningirsu,
the levee of the boundary territory of Nanshe,
and the boundary mound of Ningirsu
which was located on the bank of the Tigris in the region of Girsu,
the Namnunda-kigara of Enlil, Enki, and Ninhursag,
he removed with water.
The barley of Lagash, one grain-heap measure, he repaid.
Il, ruler of Umma.

Il made only a token payment for the grain that he owed to Lagash. He then commenced hostilities by marching into Lagash’s territory and destroying the levees of Nanshe and Ningirsu, just as his predecessors had done. The Namnunda-kigara, the boundary mound built by Eannatum that was destroyed by Ur-luma and restored by Enmetena, was again destroyed by washing it away with water.

When Enmetena, ruler of Lagash,
because of those levees, to Il had sent envoys,
Il, ruler of Umma, the stealer of fields, speaking hostilely,
“The levee of the boundary territory of Ningirsu and the
levee of the boundary territory of Nanshe are mine!” he declared.
“From the Antasura (temple) to the temple of Dimgalabzu
I shall remove the earth from them!” he declared.

This seems to be an uncharacteristically mild response from Enmetena. Why did Enmetena send his envoys instead of his armies? Il had refused to repay the grain he owed, then marched into Lagash’s territory, destroyed the boundary levees, destroyed the daises of the holy gods, and made threats to the sacred Antasura temple. All of these actions were deliberate acts of war, so why didn’t Enmetena pounce on Il? This is what his predecessors would have done. Il, the “stealer of fields”, is allowed to get away with it?

We can only speculate on Enmetena’s reasons for not going to war. Perhaps he had other pressing issues at home; perhaps his treasury was empty or he had another war on another frontier that needed attending to. Perhaps he was merely sick of war and hoped to resolve the problem diplomatically.

But Enlil and Ninhursag did not allow him this. {i.e., not allow Il to destroy the levees}
Enmetena, ruler of Lagash, nominated by Ningirsu,
by the just command of Enlil, the just command of Ningirsu,
and the just command of Nanshe,
that levee from the Tigris River to the Princely Canal he constructed.
The Namnunda-kigara’s base he built with stones for him,
and for his master who loved him, Ningirsu,
and his mistress who loved him, Nanshe,
he restored it. 

Lagash and Umma define their frontier after years of warfare.

Notice how the Namnunda-kigara, the dais of the gods built by Eannatum and destroyed twice before, is now rebuilt with stone so it couldn’t easily be washed away with water.

As no battle is mentioned, it seems that Enmetena was successful at resolving the situation diplomatically without resorting to weapons (though it seems somewhat anticlimatic). Now we are left wondering, why did Il back down? He had escalated the situation to the very brink of war, now he silently folds his tents and goes back home? Again we can only speculate. When he assumed power after the ineffectual Ur-luma, he probably made a lot of bellicose statements about “teaching Lagash a lesson”.

Perhaps Enmetena made enough concessions so that Il could return home without losing face and claim a diplomatic victory. Perhaps the new king suddenly realized that he needed to strengthen his home front before he attempted another battle with Lagash. One thing is for certain, however; this wasn’t the last that would be heard of Il. He was simply biding his time.

Enmetena, ruler of Lagash, given the scepter by Enlil,
given wisdom by Enki, chosen by the heart of Nanshe,
chief ruler of Ningirsu,
the man who held fast to the commands of the gods,
may his (personal) god Shul-mush{x}pa
for the life of Enmetena unto distant days
before Ningirsu and Nanshe stand (interceding) for him!
Enmetena, ensi of Lagash.

Enmetena’s foundation cone ends with an invocation to the gods and a warning to anyone who would dare trespass on his territory:

A Man of Umma
who, over the levee of the boundary territory of Ningirsu
or over the levee of the boundary territory of Nanshe
in order by violence to take fields might (in the future) cross,
whether he be a man of Umma or a man of a foreign land,
may Enlil annihilate him!
Ningirsu, when his big battle-net he has cast over him,
his great hands and great feet may he bring down (upon him) from above!
When the people in his city have raised a hand against him,
in the middle of his city may they kill him!

Enmetena was sadly mistaken if he thought his kingdom was secure in the protection of the gods. After his death, Il would lead a full scale attack against Enmetena’s son, Enannatum II, the last king of Ur-Nanshe’s dynasty, and seize control of the Guedena. This was the first time in more than a generation that Umma was victorious over Lagash. Thereafter, Umma was in the ascendency and Lagash was on the decline.

The final culmination of the wars between Umma and Lagash would occur a generation later when Lugalzagesi, another “Man of Umma”, would sack and burn the city of Lagash. The heyday of Umma would be brief, however. Soon afterward, Umma, Lagash, and all the rest of Sumer was conquered by the Akkadians under Sargon the Great. Only then did the two cities stop fighting each other. It would be more than two centuries before Sumer was liberated from the Akkadians. By then, Umma and Lagash had finally learned to live in peace.

Lagash